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Abstract. We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games
played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium
introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantita-
tive setting. As for the Boolean setting, our notion of secure equilibrium
refines the classical notion of Nash equilibrium. We prove that secure
equilibria always exist in a large class of weighted games which includes
common measures like sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and dis-
counted sum. Moreover we show that one can synthesize finite-memory
strategy profiles with few memory. We also prove that the constrained
existence problem for secure equilibria is decidable for sup, inf, lim sup,
lim inf and mean-payoff measures. Our solutions rely on new results for
zero-sum quantitative games with lexicographic objectives that are in-
teresting on their own right.
1 Introduction
Two-player zero-sum infinite duration games played on graphs is a useful frame-
work to formalize many important problems in computer science. System syn-
thesis, and especially synthesis of reactive systems, is one of those important
problems, see for example [28,26]. In this application, the vertices and the edges
of the graph represent the states and the transitions of the system; one player
represents the system to synthesize, whereas the other represents the environ-
ment with which the system interacts. In the classical setting, the environment
is considered as antagonist and the objectives of the two players are complemen-
tary, leading to a so-called zero-sum game. There are many known results about
those zero-sum games [23,14,16,19].
Modeling the environment as completely adversarial is usually a bold ab-
straction of reality. However it is often used as it is simple and sound: a winning
strategy against a completely adversarial model of the environment, is winning
against any environment which pursues its own objective. But this approach
may fail to find a winning strategy whereas there exists a solution when the
objective of the environment is taken into account. In this case, we need to con-
sider the more general framework of non zero-sum games. The classical notion of
rational behavior in this context is commonly formalized as Nash equilibria [24].
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Nash equilibria capture rational behaviors when the players only care about
their own payoff (internal criteria), and they are indifferent to the payoff of the
other player (external criteria). In the setting of synthesis, the more appropriate
notion is the adversarial external criteria, where the players are as harmful as
possible to the other players without sabotaging their own objectives. This has
inspired the study of refinements of Nash equilibria, like the notion of secure
equilibria that captures the adversarial external criteria and is at the basis of
compositional synthesis algorithms [12]. In secure equilibria, lexicographic objec-
tives are considered: each player first tries to maximize his own payoff, and then
tries to minimize the opponent’s payoff. It is shown in [12] that secure equilibria
are those Nash equilibria which represent enforceable contracts between the two
players.
In this paper, we extend the notion of secure equilibria from the Boolean
setting with ω-regular objectives of [12] to a quantitative setting where objectives
are non necessarily ω-regular. More precisely, we consider two-player non zero-
sum turn-based games played on weighted graphs, called weighted games with
objectives defined by classical measures considered in the literature for infinite
plays: sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted sum [8]. In our
setting, the edges of the weighted graph are labelled with pairs of rational values
that are used to assign two values to each infinite play: one value models the
reward of player 1, and the other the reward of player 2.
Contributions. Our contributions are threefold. (1) We show that all weighted
games with the classical measures have secure equilibria. We also establish that
there exist simple profiles of strategies that witness such equilibria: finite-memory
strategies with a linear memory size are sufficient for most of the measures (poly-
nomial size for inf and sup measures). (2) We provide polynomial or pseudo-
polynomial (depending on the measures) algorithms for the automatic synthesis
of such strategy profiles. We thus provide the necessary algorithms to extend
the compositional synthesis framework of [11] to a quantitative setting. (3) We
prove that one can decide the existence of a secure equilibrium whose outcome
satisfies some constraints, for all measures except the discounted sum. In the
latter case, we show that this problem is connected to a challenging open prob-
lem [2,9]. Our solutions rely on the analysis of two-player zero-sum games with
lexicographic objectives (for all the measures) for which we provide worst-case
optimal algorithms. These so-called lexicographic games are interesting on their
own right and, to the best of our knowledge, were not studied in the literature.
Related work. Secure equilibria were first introduced in [12] in a Boolean setting,
and for ω-regular objectives. We extend this work to a quantitative setting in
which objectives are not necessarily ω-regular. Our contributions (1) and (2) are
very much inspired by a recent work by Brihaye et al. [6] that provides general re-
sults for the existence of Nash equilibria in a large class of multi-player weighted
graphs. We show that their main theorem is extendable to secure equilibria in
the case of two-player games. However, to adapt their theorem we need non triv-
ial new results on lexicographic games, while for Nash equilibria they can rely
on well-known results for (non lexicographic) zero-sum two-player games. Pre-
viously to [6], existence results about different kinds of equilibria (Nash, secure,
perfect, and subgame perfect) have been established for quantitative reachability
objectives in multi-player weighted games [4,5,22]. In [30], among other results,
the authors study the decision problem of both the existence and the constraint
existence of Nash equilibria in multi-player weighted games for the mean-payoff
measure. A part of our contribution (3) is inspired by some of their techniques.
The rational synthesis problem is studied in [17], when a system interacts with
agents that all have their own objectives. This problem asks to construct a strat-
egy profile that enforces the objective of the system, and which is an equilibrium
for the agents. The objectives are ω-regular or defined by deterministic latticed
Bu¨chi word automata (they do not include mean-payoff and discounted sum ob-
jectives), and secure equilibria are not considered explicitly. Lexicographic games
were first considered in [1], for a mean-payoff measure that differs from the one
studied in this paper. The proof technique that we develop is similar to their
approach but requires non trivial adaptations. To the best of our knowledge,
lexicographic games for all the other objectives (sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, and
discounted sum) have not been studied previously.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we first recall classical notions on games
and equilibria, we then introduce the three problems studied in this paper and
our solutions for the sup, inf, lim sup, lim inf, mean-payoff, and discounted
sum measures (Problems 1-3 and Theorems 1-3). In Section 3, for each of the
three problems, we provide a general framework of weighted games in which the
problem can be solved (Propositions 1-3). Those frameworks impose in particular
the determinacy of two (one for each player) lexicographic games associated with
the initial game. Lexicographic games are introduced in Section 3 and proved to
be determined in Section 4, where their complexity is also established. With these
results, in Section 3, we are able to prove Theorems 1-2, because games with the
considered measures all fall in the frameworks proposed for solving Problems 1-2.
The framework proposed for the last problem requires an additional hypothesis
that we study in Section 5. Theorem 3 can then be derived for all the measures,
except the discounted sum. We also show that Problem 3 for this measure is
linked to a challenging open problem [2,9]. In Section 6, we give a conclusion.
2 Weighted Games and Studied Problems
In this section, we recall the notions of weighted game, Nash equilibrium, secure
equilibrium, and we state the problems that we want to solve.
2.1 Weighted Games
We here consider two-player turn-based non zero-sum weighted games such that
the weights are seen as rewards, and the two players want to maximize their
payoff (this payoff is computed from the weights, for example as in Definition 2).
Definition 1. A two-player non zero-sum weighted game is a tuple G = (V, V1,
V2, E, r,Payoff) where
– (V,E) is a finite directed graph, the arena of the game, with vertices V and
edges E ⊆ V × V , such that for each v ∈ V , there exists e = (v, v′) ∈ E for
some v′ ∈ V (no deadlock),
– V1, V2 form a partition of V such that Vi is the set of vertices controlled by
player i ∈ {1, 2},
– r = (r1, r2) is the weight function such that ri : E → Q associates a rational
reward with each edge for player i ∈ {1, 2},
– Payoff = (Payoff1,Payoff2) is the payoff function such that Payoffi : V
ω → R
is the payoff function of player i ∈ {1, 2} such that Payoffi is defined starting
from ri.
When an initial vertex v0 ∈ V is fixed, we call (G, v0) an initialized weighted
game. A play of (G, v0) is an infinite sequence ρ = ρ0ρ1 . . . ∈ V ω such that
ρ0 = v0 and (ρi, ρi+1) ∈ E for all i ∈ N. Histories of (G, v0) are finite sequences
h = h0 . . . hn ∈ V + defined in the same way. A prefix (resp. suffix ) of a play ρ
is a finite sequence ρ0 . . . ρn (resp. infinite sequence ρnρn+1 . . .) denoted by ρ≤n
(resp. ρ≥n). The length of ρ≤n is the number n of its edges. For a play ρ ∈ V ω
and a player i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by ri(ρ) = ri(ρ0, ρ1)ri(ρ1, ρ2) . . . the sequence
of player i weights along ρ. The payoff of ρ for player i is given by Payoffi(ρ),
and Payoff(ρ) = (Payoff1(ρ),Payoff2(ρ)) is the payoff of ρ in G.
A strategy σ for player i ∈ {1, 2} is a function σ : V ∗Vi → V assigning to each
history hv ∈ V ∗Vi a vertex v′ = σ(hv) such that (v, v′) ∈ E. We denote by Σi the
set of strategies of player i. A strategy σ for player i is positional if σ(h) = σ(h′)
for all histories h, h′ ending with the same vertex (σ only depends on the last
vertex of the history). In particular, a positional strategy is a function σ : Vi → V
(instead of σ : V ∗Vi → V ). A strategy σ is a finite-memory strategy if it only
needs finite memory of the history (recorded by a finite strategy automaton).
Formally a finite strategy automaton for player i ∈ {1, 2} over a weighted game
G = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff) is a Mealy automaton M = (M,m0, V, δ, ν) where:
– M is a non-empty, finite set of memory states,
– m0 ∈M is the initial memory state,
– δ :M × V →M is the memory update function,
– ν : M × Vi → V is the transition choice function for player i, such that
(v, ν(m, v)) ∈ E for all m ∈M and v ∈ Vi.
This automaton defines the finite-memory strategy σM such that σM(hv) =
ν(δˆ(m0, h), v) for all hv ∈ V ∗Vi, where δˆ extends δ to histories starting from m0
as expected. The memory size of σM is defined as the size of M .
Given a strategy σ ∈ Σi with i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that a play ρ of G is consistent
with σ if ρk+1 = σ(ρ≤k) for all k ∈ N such that ρk ∈ Vi. A strategy profile of
G is a pair (σ1, σ2) of strategies, with σi ∈ Σi for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Given an
initial vertex v0, such a strategy profile determines a unique play of (G, v0) that
is consistent with both strategies. This play is called the outcome of (σ1, σ2) and
is denoted by 〈σ1, σ2〉v0 . For a history hv ∈ V
∗V , and a strategy profile (σ1, σ2),
we denote by 〈σ1|h, σ2〉v the outcome of (σ1|h, σ2) in the initialized game (G, v),
where σ1|h is the strategy defined by σ1|h(h
′v′) = σ1(hh
′v′) for all histories
h′v′ ∈ V ∗V1 that begin with v. The outcome 〈σ1, σ2|h〉v is defined similarly. We
say that a player deviates from a strategy (resp. from a play) if he does not
carefully follow this strategy (resp. play). We say that a strategy profile (σ1, σ2)
is a positional (resp. finite-memory) strategy profile if σ1 and σ2 are positional
(resp. finite-memory) strategies. The memory size of a finite-memory strategy
profile is equal to the maximum memory size of its strategies.
In this paper, we focus on several well-known payoff functions (see for in-
stance [8]).
Definition 2. Given a weighted game G = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff), we define
the payoff function Payoff as one of the measures in {Inf, Sup, LimInf, LimSup,
InfMP, SupMP, Discλ for λ ∈ ]0, 1[}, where for all i ∈ {1, 2} and ρ ∈ V ω:
– Infi(ρ) = infn∈N ri(ρn, ρn+1),
– Supi(ρ) = supn∈N ri(ρn, ρn+1),
– LimInfi(ρ) = lim inf
n→∞
ri(ρn, ρn+1),
– LimSupi(ρ) = lim sup
n→∞
ri(ρn, ρn+1),
– InfMPi(ρ) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
ri(ρk, ρk+1),
– SupMPi(ρ) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
ri(ρk, ρk+1),
– Discλi (ρ) = (1 − λ) ·
∑∞
n=0 λ
nri(ρn, ρn+1).
We also call these games Payoff weighted games.
2.2 Equilibria
We now recall the concept of Nash equilibrium and secure equilibrium. In this
aim we need to fix two lexicographic orders on R2: a lexicographic order 41 w.r.t.
the first component and a lexicographic order 42 w.r.t. the second component
such that for all (x1, x2), (x
′
1, x
′
2) ∈ R
2,
(x1, x2) 41 (x
′
1, x
′
2) iff (x1 < x
′
1) ∨ (x1 = x
′
1 ∧ x2 ≥ x
′
2),
(x1, x2) 42 (x
′
1, x
′
2) iff (x2 < x
′
2) ∨ (x2 = x
′
2 ∧ x1 ≥ x
′
1).
Notice that (R2,41) and (R
2,42) are totally ordered sets.
A strategy profile (σ1, σ2) in an initialized weighted game (G, v0) is a Nash
equilibrium if player 1 (resp. player 2) has no incentive to deviate unilaterally
from σ1 (resp. σ2), since he cannot strictly increase his payoff when using σ
′
1
(resp. σ′2) instead of σ1 (resp. σ2). The notion of secure equilibrium is stronger
in the sense that player i has no incentive to deviate from σi with respect to the
order 4i (instead of the usual order ≤ on his payoffs).
Definition 3. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game. A strategy profile
(σ1, σ2) with σi ∈ Σi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is a Nash equilibrium in (G, v0) if, for each
strategy σ′i ∈ Σi, i ∈ {1, 2},
Payoff1(〈σ
′
1, σ2〉v0) ≤ Payoff1(〈σ1, σ2〉v0),
Payoff2(〈σ1, σ
′
2〉v0) ≤ Payoff2(〈σ1, σ2〉v0).
It is a secure equilibrium in (G, v0) if, for each strategy σ
′
i ∈ Σi, i ∈ {1, 2},
Payoff(〈σ′1, σ2〉v0) 41 Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0),
Payoff(〈σ1, σ
′
2〉v0) 42 Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0).
Note that the notion of secure equilibrium is a refinement of that of Nash
equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, each player only cares about his own payoff
(he maximizes it), whereas in a secure equilibrium, he cares about the payoff of
both players (he maximizes his payoff and then minimizes the payoff of the other
player).
With the notation of Definition 3, we say that σ′1 is a profitable deviation
for player 1 w.r.t. (σ1, σ2) if Payoff1(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) < Payoff1(〈σ
′
1, σ2〉v0) (resp.
Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≺1 Payoff(〈σ
′
1, σ2〉v0)). Profitable deviations for player 2 are
defined similarly. With these terms, we can say that (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equi-
librium (resp. secure equilibrium) if no player has a profitable deviation w.r.t.
(σ1, σ2) for the relation < (resp. ≺i).
Example 1. Consider the initialized InfMP weighted game (G, v0) depicted in
Figure 1. Circle (resp. square) vertices are player 1 (resp. player 2) vertices, and
the weights (0, 0) are not specified. In this simple game, both players have two
positional strategies that are respectively denoted by σi and σ
′
i for each player
i ∈ {1, 2}. These strategies are depicted in Figure 1.
v0
v1 v2
v3 v4
σ1 σ′1
(4, 4)
σ2 σ′2
(4, 3) (3, 2)
Fig. 1. A simple weighted game
The strategy profiles (σ1, σ
′
2) and (σ
′
1, σ2) are secure equilibria in (G, v0).
Indeed, for the first one, only player 1 has control on the play 〈σ1, σ′2〉v0 with
payoff (4, 4), and he decreases his payoff if he plays strategy σ′1 instead of σ1
((3, 2) ≺1 (4, 4)). For the second one, both players have control on the play
〈σ′1, σ2〉v0 with payoff (4, 3). If player 1 plays σ1 instead of σ
′
1, he keeps the same
payoff but increases the payoff of player 2 ((4, 4) ≺1 (4, 3)). If player 2 plays σ′2
instead of σ2, he decreases his payoff ((3, 2) ≺2 (4, 3)). Hence in both examples no
player has a profitable deviation, and these strategy profiles are secure equilibria
(and thus Nash equilibria) in (G, v0).
However the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium which is not a
secure equilibrium. Indeed, σ′1 is a profitable deviation for player 1 since by
playing σ′1 instead of σ1, he keeps his own payoff but can decrease the payoff of
player 2.
Finally, the strategy profile (σ′1, σ
′
2) is neither a secure equilibrium nor a Nash
equilibrium.
2.3 Problems and Main Theorems
To conclude this section, we state the three problems studied in the paper and
our results. Let (G, v0) be an initialized two-player non zero-sum weighted game.
Problem 1. Does there exist a secure equilibrium in (G, v0)? If it is the case, does
there exist a finite-memory secure equilibrium?
Problem 2. What is the complexity of constructing a (finite-memory) secure
equilibrium in (G, v0) if one exists?
Problem 3. Given two thresholds µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})2, is it decidable whether
there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) such that
µ ≤ Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≤ ν,
i.e. µi ≤ Payoffi(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≤ νi for i ∈ {1, 2}?
As expected, if no restriction is given on the payoff function used in weighted
games, the answer to Problem 1 is negative. An example of a weighted game
with no Nash equilibrium (and thus with no secure equilibrium) is given in [6].
In this paper, we solve the stated problems for weighted games with the payoff
functions given in Definition 2. Our solutions are as follows.
Theorem 1. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game. Then (G, v0) has a
secure equilibrium with memory bounded by |V | + 2 (resp. |V | · |E|2 + 3) for
payoff functions InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup and Discλ (resp. Inf and Sup).
Theorem 2. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game. Then one can compute
a finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) in pseudo-polynomial time (resp.
polynomial time) for payoff functions InfMP, SupMP and Discλ (resp. LimInf,
LimSup, Inf and Sup).
Theorem 3. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game and µ, ν ∈ (Q∪{±∞})2
be two thresholds. Then one can decide in NP ∩ co-NP (resp. in P) whether there
exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) such that µ ≤ Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≤ ν
for payoff functions InfMP and SupMP (resp. LimInf, LimSup, Inf and Sup).
All these results are summarized in Tables 1-2.
Memory size Construction time
InfMP, SupMP |V |+ 2 pseudo-polynomial
LimInf, LimSup |V |+ 2 polynomial
Inf, Sup |V | · |E|2 + 3 polynomial
Discλ |V |+ 2 pseudo-polynomial
Table 1. Memory size and construction time of a finite-memory secure equilibrium
(see Theorems 1-2)
Complexity
InfMP, SupMP NP ∩ co-NP
LimInf, LimSup P
Inf, Sup P
Discλ ?
Table 2. Complexity of Problem 3 (see Theorem 3)
3 Lexicographic Payoff Games and Equilibria
To solve Problems 1-3, we follow the approach proposed in [6] to solve the first
problem for Nash equilibria (instead of secure equilibria). The general idea is
the following one. Given an initialized (non zero-sum) weighted game (G, v0),
we derive two well-chosen two-player (zero-sum) games G41 and G42 , and un-
der adequate hypotheses, we obtain properties about secure equilibria in (G, v0)
through determinacy results and characterization of the optimal strategies of
G41 and G42 .
In this section, we first introduce the games G41 and G42 . Then for each
of the three studied problems, we propose a general framework (i.e. adequate
general hypotheses on (G, v0), G41 and G42) under which we are able to solve
the considered problem (Propositions 1-3).
Later in Sections 4 and 5, we will prove that these hypotheses are satisfied
for most of the weighted games with the payoff functions of Definition 2. We will
thus be able to prove Theorems 1-3 as a consequence of Propositions 1-3.
3.1 Lexicographic Payoff Games
Let G be a weighted game as in Definition 1. We associate with G two zero-sum
games G1 and G2, one for each player, that are respectively equipped with the
lexicographic order 41 and 42 used to compare payoffs of these games.
Definition 4. From a weighted game G = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff) as in Def-
inition 1, we derive a zero-sum lexicographic payoff game G41 of the form
(V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff,41).
In the zero-sum game G41 , the two players have antagonistic goals. For each
play ρ ∈ V ω, player 1 receives the payoff Payoff(ρ) that he wants to maximize
w.r.t. the lexicographic order 41, while player 2 pays the cost Payoff(ρ) that he
wants to minimize w.r.t. 41. When Payoff is one among the payoff functions of
Definition 2, we say that G41 is a Payoff lexicographic payoff game.
We also consider a dual lexicographic payoff game G42 = (V, V2, V1, E, r,
Payoff,42) where the roles of the two players are exchanged and the used lexi-
cographic order is 42. In this game player 2 wants to maximize Payoff(ρ) w.r.t.
42, while player 1 wants to minimize it.
Definition 5. Given a lexicographic payoff game G41 , we define for every vertex
v ∈ V the upper value Val(v) and the lower value Val(v) respectively as:
Val(v) = inf
σ2∈Σ2
sup
σ1∈Σ1
Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v),
Val(v) = sup
σ1∈Σ1
inf
σ2∈Σ2
Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v).
The game G41 is determined if, for every v ∈ V , we have Val(v) = Val(v). We
also say that G41 has a value from v, and we write Val(v) = Val(v) = Val(v).
In the previous definition, let us remind that the infimum and supremum
functions are applied on a set of payoffs lexicographically ordered with 41.
Definition 6. Given a lexicographic payoff game G41 and a vertex v ∈ V , we
say that σ⋆1 ∈ Σ1 is an optimal strategy for player 1 and vertex v if, for each
strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2, we have
Val(v) 41 Payoff(〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v).
Similarly, σ⋆2 ∈ Σ2 is an optimal strategy for player 2 and vertex v if, for each
strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1, we have
Payoff(〈σ1, σ
⋆
2〉v) 41 Val(v).
We say that G41 is positionally-determined if it is determined and has positional
optimal strategies for both players and all vertices. Additionally, we say that G41
is uniformly-determined if the positional optimal strategies σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2 can be chosen
globally independently of vertex v. We call these strategies uniform.
Example 2. We come back to the weighted game G of Figure 1, and consider the
InfMP lexicographic payoff game G41 . Let us show that this game is uniformly-
determined. Indeed each vertex has a value. In case of vertices v1, v3 and v4, the
value is trivially the weight of the loop on these vertices. Vertex v2 has value
(3, 2) since the worse that player 2 can do is to play strategy σ′2 ((3, 2) ≺1 (4, 3)).
Vertex v0 has value (4, 4) (realised by strategy σ1 of player 1). The positional
optimal strategies are σ1 and σ
′
2 for player 1 and player 2 respectively, they are
uniform.
In the sequel, we will sometimes use the next lemma to prove that a game
has a value from v with optimal strategies σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2 for both players.
Lemma 1. If for all v ∈ V , there are a pair (α, β) ∈ R2, and two strategies
σ⋆1 ∈ Σ1, σ
⋆
2 ∈ Σ2 such that for all σ1 ∈ Σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ2,
Payoff(〈σ1, σ
⋆
2〉v) 41 (α, β) 41 Payoff(〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v), (1)
then the game is determined and σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2 are optimal strategies for v such that
Payoff(〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v) = (α, β) = Val(v).
Proof. If we consider the strategies σ1 = σ
⋆
1 and σ2 = σ
⋆
2 in (1), we clearly
have that Payoff(〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v) = (α, β). From Definition 6, we have that Val(v) 41
Payoff(〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v) 41 Val(v). Let us show that Val(v) 41 (α, β) 41 Val(v). It will
follow that Val(v) = Val(v) = Val(v) = Payoff(〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v) and σ
⋆
1 , σ
⋆
2 are optimal
strategies.
By (1), we have
(α, β) = inf
σ2∈Σ2
(α, β) 41 inf
σ2∈Σ2
Payoff(〈σ⋆1 , σ2〉v)
41 sup
σ1∈Σ1
inf
σ2∈Σ2
Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v) = Val(v).
In a similar way, one can show that Val(v) 41 (α, β). ⊓⊔
Additionally to the notion of lexicographic payoff game, we need to define
the next properties in a way to solve Problems 1-3.
Definition 7 ([6]). Let G = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff) be a weighted game. The
payoff function Payoffi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is prefix-linear in G if, for every vertex v ∈ V
and history hv ∈ V +, there exists a ∈ R and b ∈ R+ such that, for every play
ρ ∈ V ω whose first vertex is v, we have :
Payoffi(hρ) = a+ b · Payoffi(ρ).
Moreover, Payoffi is prefix-independent if for all v ∈ V , hv ∈ V
+ and ρ ∈ V ω
whose first vertex is v, we have Payoffi(hρ) = Payoffi(ρ).
Clearly the notion of prefix-independent payoff function is a particular case
of that of prefix-linear.
Remark 1. The two components of the payoff functions LimInf, LimSup, InfMP
and SupMP are clearly prefix-independent.
For payoff function Discλ, the components are not prefix-independent but
rather prefix-linear (see [6]), since for h = ρ0 . . . ρn−1 and ρ = ρnρn+1 . . ., we
have for i ∈ {1, 2} that Discλi (hρ) = (1 − λ) ·
∑∞
k=0 λ
k · ri(ρk, ρk+1) = (1 − λ) ·∑n−1
k=0 λ
k · ri(ρk, ρk+1) + λn · Disc
λ
i (ρ).
Finally neither Inf nor Sup functions have prefix-linear components. Indeed,
it is easy to find a history h and two plays ρ, ρ′ such that Inf(hρ) < Inf(ρ), Inf(ρ′)
with Inf(ρ) 6= Inf(ρ′), which implies that a = Inf(hρ) and b = 0 in Definition 7.
We then get a contradiction by taking ρ′′ such that Inf(ρ′′) < a.
3.2 Existence of Secure Equilibria
We can now state the general framework under which Problem 1 is positively
solved. This framework is composed of all initialized weighted games (G, v0)
such that each lexicographic payoff game G4i is uniformly-determined, and each
payoff function Payoffi is prefix-linear, with i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 1. Let G = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff) be a weighted game and v0 be an
initial vertex. If for each i ∈ {1, 2}, Payoffi is prefix-linear, and G
4i is uniformly-
determined, then there exists a finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) with
memory size bounded by |V |+ 2.
This proposition is an adaptation to secure equilibria in two-player games
of a theorem3 given in [6,13] for the existence of Nash equilibria in multi-
player games. The main difference is that we here need to work with (two-
dimensional) lexicographic payoff games instead of classical (one-dimensional,
non lexicographic) zero-sum quantitative games. The proof of this proposition
is similar to the one given in [6,13]. Nevertheless, we give this proof in a way to
have a self-contained paper. In the next sections, we show that the hypotheses
of Proposition 1 are satisfied for most of payoff functions in Definition 2.
Proof. Let G = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff) be a weighted game and let v0 ∈ V be
an initial vertex. We know that the lexicographic payoff game G4i is uniformly-
determined for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Let us fix some notation. In G4i , player i wants
to maximize his payoff against the other player who wants to minimize it. To
emphasize this situation, we denote by player −i (instead of player 3 − i) the
player that is opposed to player i in G4i . Moreover we denote by σ⋆i and σ
⋆
−i
the uniform optimal strategies for player i and −i respectively in G4i . In other
words, σ⋆1 denotes a uniform optimal strategy of player 1 in G
41 , and σ⋆−1 denotes
a uniform optimal strategy of player 2 in G41 . Similarly, σ⋆2 (resp. σ
⋆
−2) denotes
a uniform optimal strategy of player 2 (resp. player 1) in G42 .
We first show that there exists a secure equilibrium (τ1, τ2) in (G, v0), as
follows: player i plays according to his strategy σ⋆i in G
4i , and punishes the
3 In Theorem 10 of [6], one hypothesis is missing: determinacy must be uniform de-
terminacy.
other player j if he is the first player to deviate from his strategy σ⋆j in G
4j , by
playing according to σ⋆−j in G
4j .
Formally, let ρ = 〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v0 be the outcome of the optimal strategies (σ
⋆
1 , σ
⋆
2)
from v0. We need to specify a punishment function P : V
+ → {⊥, 1, 2} that
detects who is the first player to deviate from the play ρ, i.e. who has to be
punished. For the initial vertex v0, we define P (v0) = ⊥ and for every history
hv ∈ V +V starting in v0, we let:
P (hv) =


⊥ if P (h) = ⊥ and hv is a prefix of ρ,
i if P (h) = ⊥, hv is not a prefix of ρ, and h ∈ V ∗Vi,
P (h) otherwise (P (h) 6= ⊥).
For each player i ∈ {1, 2}we define the strategy τi such that for all hv ∈ V ∗Vi,
τi(hv) =
{
σ⋆i (v) if P (hv) = ⊥ or i,
σ⋆−j(v) otherwise where j = 3− i is the other player.
(2)
Clearly, the outcome of (τ1, τ2) is the play ρ = 〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v0 . Let us show that
(τ1, τ2) is a secure equilibrium in (G, v0). We first prove that player 1 has no
profitable deviation. As a contradiction, let us assume that τ ′1 is a profitable
deviation for player 1 w.r.t. (τ1, τ2). We thus have that:
Payoff(ρ) ≺1 Payoff(ρ
′) (3)
with ρ′ = 〈τ ′1, τ2〉v0 .
Let hv ∈ V ∗V be the longest prefix common to ρ and ρ′. This prefix exists
and is finite as both plays ρ and ρ′ start from vertex v0 and ρ 6= ρ′. As the
optimal strategies σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2 are uniform, we can write that ρ = h 〈σ
⋆
1 , σ
⋆
2〉v. In the
case of ρ′, player 1 does not follow his strategy σ⋆1 any more from vertex v, and
so, player 2 punishes him by playing according to his optimal strategy σ⋆−1 after
history hv. Therefore we have ρ′ = h
〈
τ ′1|h, σ
⋆
−1
〉
v
.
As the payoff functions are prefix-linear, there exist a = (a1, a2) ∈ R2 and
b = (b1, b2) ∈ (R+)2 such that
Payoff(ρ′) = a+ b · Payoff
(〈
τ ′1|h, σ
⋆
−1
〉
v
)
, and
Payoff(ρ) = a+ b · Payoff (〈σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2〉v) .
Since σ⋆−1 is an optimal strategy for player 2 in the lexicographic payoff game
G41 , we have:
Payoff(ρ′) 41 a+ b ·Val
1(v), (4)
where Val1(v) is the value of v in G41 . Furthermore, as σ⋆1 is an optimal strategy
for player 1 in G41 , it follows that:
a+ b ·Val1(v) 41 Payoff(ρ). (5)
From Equations (4) and (5) we have that Payoff(ρ′) 41 Payoff(ρ) in contradiction
with Equation (3). This proves that player 1 has no profitable deviation. We can
show that player 2 has not profitable deviation in the same way.
We now prove that (τ1, τ2) is a finite-memory strategy profile such that the
memory size of both τ1 and τ2 is bounded by |V |+2. For this purpose, we define
a finite strategy automaton for both players that remembers the play ρ and who
has to be punished. As the play ρ is the outcome of the uniform strategy profile
(σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2), we can write ρ = v0 . . . vk−1(vk . . . vn)
ω where 0 ≤ k ≤ n ≤ |V |, vl ∈ V
for all 0 ≤ l ≤ n and these vertices are all different. For any i ∈ {1, 2}, let
Mi = (M,m0, V, δ, ν) be the strategy automaton of player i, where4:
– M = {v0v0, v0v1, . . . , vn−1vn, vnvk}∪ {1, 2}. With M we remember the next
edge that should be chosen to be sure that both players follow ρ, or the
player j ∈ {1, 2} that has first deviated.
– m0 = v0v0. This memory element means that the play has not begun yet.
– δ :M × V →M is defined for all m ∈M and v ∈ V as follows:
δ(m, v) =


vlvl+1 if m = uvl and v = vl, with u ∈ V, l ∈ {0, . . . , n}
j if m = j ∈ {1, 2} or (m = uvl, v 6= vl,
with u ∈ Vj , l ∈ {0, . . . , n})
Function δ udpates the memory either to the next edge of ρ in case of no
deviation, or to j if player j was the first to deviate.
– ν :M × Vi → V is defined for all m ∈M and v ∈ Vi as follows:
ν(m, v) =
{
σ⋆i (v) if δ(m, v) = vlvl+1, with l ∈ {0, . . . , n}
σ⋆−j(v) if δ(m, v) = j ∈ {1, 2}
Function ν proposes to play according to Equation (2).
Obviously, the strategy σMi computed by the strategy automaton Mi ex-
actly corresponds to the strategy τi of the secure equilibrium. Notice that in the
definition of M , we can forget the memory element i. Indeed if player i follows
the strategy computed byMi, then he never deviates from the play ρ. Therefore,
M has size at most |V | + 2, and strategy τi requires a memory of size at most
|V |+ 2. ⊓⊔
Example 3. We come back again to the weighted game G of Figure 1 with the
initial vertex v0. Uniform optimal strategies in game G41 are σ⋆1 = σ1 and
σ⋆−1 = σ
′
2 (we use the notations of the previous proof). In G
42 , they are σ⋆−2 = σ
′
1
and σ⋆2 = σ2. We thus obtain the secure equilibrium (τ1, τ2) leading to the
outcome ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉v0 . If player 1 deviates from ρ (in order to decrease player 2
payoff), then player 2 punishes him by playing σ′2 which is the worst for player 1
(since it decreases his payoff).
4 In this definition, vertex vn+1 means vertex vk.
Notice that the proof of Proposition 1 also holds for payoff functions that
mix different measures for the two players, like for example InfMP1 for player 1
and Sup2 for player 2.
We could also prove a result similar to Proposition 1 such that the hy-
potheses are replaced by the following ones: (G, v0) is an initialized weighted
game such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, G4i is determined (less restrictive than
uniformly-determined) and Payoffi is prefix-independent (more restrictive than
prefix-linear). The same kind of result is proved in [13] in the case of Nash equi-
libria; its proof can be easily adapted to the case of secure equilibria as done for
the proof of Proposition 1.
3.3 Construction of Secure Equilibria
In the previous section, we have proposed a rather general framework of weighted
games for which Problem 1 has a positive answer. In this section we show that
we can solve Problem 2 in the same general framework, with the additional
hypothesis that one can compute uniform optimal strategies in G4i , for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 2. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game such that for each i ∈
{1, 2}, Payoffi is prefix-linear, and G
4i is uniformly-determined with computable
uniform optimal strategies. If such strategies can be computed in C time for both
players, then a finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) can also be constructed
in C time.
Proof. By Proposition 1, we know that there exists a finite-memory secure equi-
librium (τ1, τ2) in (G, v0). Moreover the proof of this theorem indicates how to
construct (τ1, τ2) from uniform optimal strategies in G41 and G42 (see (2) and
the finite strategy automaton proposed for both players at the end of this proof).
It follows that a finite-memory secure equilibrium can be constructed in C time.
⊓⊔
3.4 Constrained Existence of Secure Equilibria
Let us turn to Problem 3. First notice that contrarily to Problem 2, strategy
profiles for solving this problem require infinite memory, as shown by the next
example.
v0 v1
(0, 0)
(2, 0)
(0, 0)
(0, 2)
Fig. 2. An weighted game that shows the need of infinite memory for Problem 3
Example 4. Consider the initialized InfMP weighted game (G, v0) of Figure 2.
Take thresholds µ = (1, 1) and ν = (+∞,+∞).
As explained in [32, Proof of Lemma 7], any strategy profile that is finite-
memory produces an ultimately periodic outcome ρ such that Payoff1(ρ) +
Payoff2(ρ) < 1, thus not satisfying threshold (1, 1). However there exists an
infinite path ρ∗ in (G, v0) with payoff equal to (1, 1): ρ∗ visits n times vertex v0
and then n times vertex v1, and repeats this forever with increasing values of n.
Let us define a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) such that its outcome is equal to
ρ∗, and as soon as one player deviates from ρ∗, the other player punishes him
by always chosing an edge with weights (0, 0). This strategy profile is a secure
equilibrium since one verifies that the player who first deviates receives a payoff
of 0 instead of 1.
Therefore there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) that satisfies
µ ≤ Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≤ ν, but it cannot be finite-memory.
We show that Problem 3 is decidable in the same framework as for Problem 1,
with the additional hypotheses that one can compute values in G4i , for i ∈ {1, 2},
and the next problem is decidable.
Problem 4. Let G = (V,E, v0, r,Val) be a finite directed graph with an initial
vertex v0, a weight function r = (r1, r2) with ri : E → Q, and a value function
Val = (Val1,Val2), with Vali : V → Q2. Let µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})2 be two thresh-
olds. Is it decidable whether there exists an infinite path ρ in G starting in v0
such that
– ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},Vali(ρk) 4i Payoff(ρ≥k), and
– µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν?
Proposition 3. Let (G, v0) be an initialized weighted game and µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪
{±∞})2 be two thresholds. Suppose that
– for each i ∈ {1, 2}, Payoffi is prefix-linear, and G
4i is uniformly-determined
with computable values,
– Problem 4 is decidable for the graph G constructed from G such that both
functions Vali, i ∈ {1, 2}, are constructed from the values Vali(v), v ∈ V , in
G4i .
One can decide whether there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) such
that µ ≤ Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≤ ν.
The proof of this theorem is based on the next lemma that characterizes the
outcomes of secure equilibria in (G, v0).
Lemma 2. Let ρ be a play in G starting in v0. Then ρ is the outcome of a secure
equilibrium in (G, v0) if and only if
∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Vali(ρk) 4i Payoff(ρ≥k). (6)
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we denote by σ⋆i and σ
⋆
−i the uniform
optimal strategies for player i and −i respectively in G4i .
First, let (τ1, τ2) be a secure equilibrium in (G, v0), and ρ = 〈τ1, τ2〉v0 be
its outcome. By contradiction, assume that there exists k ≥ 0 and i ∈ {1, 2}
such that Payoff(ρ≥k) ≺i Val
i(ρk). Take such a k as small as possible and let
h = ρ≤k−1. Suppose that i = 1 (the case i = 2 is similar). We can then construct
a profitable deviation τ ′1 for player 1: he follows the strategy τ1 until vertex ρk
from which he uses his optimal strategy σ⋆1 in G
41 . As Payoff is prefix-linear and
σ⋆1 is uniform, it follows that for some a ∈ R
2 and b ∈ (R+)2, we have
Payoff(〈τ1, τ2〉v0) = a+ b · Payoff(ρ≥k)
≺1 a+ b ·Val
1(ρk)
41 a+ b · Payoff(〈σ
⋆
1 , τ2|h〉ρk)
= Payoff(〈τ ′1, τ2〉v0).
This is impossible since (τ1, τ2) is a secure equilibrium.
Next, let ρ be a play that starts with v0 and satisfies (6). We define a strategy
profile (τ1, τ2) such that 〈τ1, τ2〉v0 = ρ, and as soon as player i deviates, the other
player uses his strategy σ⋆−i in G
4i to punish him. Let us prove that (τ1, τ2)
is a secure equilibrium in (G, v0). Let τ ′1 be a strategy for player 1 such that
ρ′ = 〈τ ′1, τ2〉v0 6= ρ, and let hρk be the longest common prefix of ρ and ρ
′. We
have for some a ∈ R2 and b ∈ (R+)2:
Payoff(〈τ ′1, τ2〉v0) = a+ b · Payoff(
〈
τ ′1|h, σ
⋆
−1
〉
ρk
)
41 a+ b · Val
1(ρk)
41 a+ b · Payoff(ρ≥k)
= Payoff(ρ).
This shows that player 1 has no profitable deviation. The same holds for player 2.
Hence (τ1, τ2) is a secure equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 3). We propose the next algorithm. First compute Vali(v)
for each vertex v of G4i , i ∈ {1, 2}. Then construct from (G, v0) the graph
G = (V,E, v0, r,Val). Finally test whether there exists a path ρ in G start-
ing in v0 such that ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},Val
i(ρk) 4i Payoff(ρ≥k), and µ ≤
Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν. Notice that it is indeed an algorithm since each G4i is com-
putationally uniformly-determined, and Problem 4 is decidable. This algorithm
is correct by Lemma 2. ⊓⊔
Again, as for Propositions 1-2, Proposition 3 also holds for distinct payoff
functions that mix different measures for the two players
4 Determinacy of Lexicographic Payoff Games
In Section 3, we have established strong links between secure equilibria in ini-
tialized weighted games (G, v0) and determinacy of the two lexicographic payoff
games G4i , i ∈ {1, 2}. We have shown how to solve Problems 1-3 under some ade-
quate general hypotheses (see Propositions 1-3). In this section, we study the de-
terminacy of lexicographic payoff games for the payoff functions proposed in Def-
inition 2. We show that for all payoffs, these games are uniformly-determined, ex-
cept for the Inf and Sup payoffs for which they are only positionally-determined.
We also study the complexity of computing values and optimal strategies for
these games. Besides being important ingredients to solve Problems 1-3, these
results are also very interesting on their own right. Our results are the following
ones (we state them only for G41):
Theorem 4. Let G41 be a lexicographic payoff game. Then G41 is uniformly-
determined (resp. positionally-determined) for payoff functions InfMP, SupMP,
LimInf, LimSup and Discλ (resp. Inf and Sup).
Theorem 5. Let G41 be a lexicographic payoff game.
1. Let v be a vertex of G41 and (α, β) ∈ Q2 be a pair of rationals. Decid-
ing whether (α, β) 41 Val(v) is in NP ∩ co-NP for payoff functions InfMP,
SupMP and Discλ, and P-complete for payoff functions LimInf, LimSup, Inf
and Sup.
2. The (rational) value of each vertex of G41 can be computed in pseudo-
polynomial time for payoff functions InfMP, SupMP and Discλ, and in poly-
nomial time for payoff functions LimInf, LimSup, Inf and Sup.
3. Uniform (resp. positional) optimal strategies for both players can be computed
in pseudo-polynomial time for payoff functions InfMP, SupMP and Discλ,
and in polynomial time for payoff functions LimInf and LimSup (resp. Inf
and Sup).
All the results of Theorems 4- 5 are summarized in Table 3.
determinacy (α, β) 41 Val(v)? values optimal strategies
InfMP, SupMP uniform NP ∩ co-NP pseudo-polynomial pseudo-polynomial
LimInf, LimSup uniform P-complete polynomial polynomial
Inf, Sup positional P-complete polynomial polynomial
Discλ uniform NP ∩ co-NP pseudo-polynomial pseudo-polynomial
Table 3. Obtained results for lexicographic games (see Theorems 4-5)
Theorem 4 states that every Inf lexicographic payoff game is positionally-
determined. The next example shows that there is no hope to have uniformly-
determined such games.
Example 5. Consider the Inf lexicographic payoff game depicted in Figure 3.
Clearly, this game is positionally-determined, such that each vertex has value
(2, 0) except vertex v4 that has value (3, 1). Let us show that it is not uniformly-
determined. To guarantee value (2, 0) for v0, player 1 has to use the positional
strategy σ⋆1 such that σ
⋆
1(v4) = v3. Indeed, this is the only way to have (2, 0) 41
Inf(〈σ⋆1 , σ2〉v0) for all strategy σ2 of player 2. However, with this strategy, player 1
cannot guarantee value (3, 1) for v4.
v0 v2
v3
v4
(2, 1)
(2, 0)
(3, 1)
(2, 0)
(2, 0)
(3, 1)
Fig. 3. An Inf lexicographic payoff game that is not uniformly-determined.
Before giving the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5, notice that we are now able
to prove Theorems 1-2 for the payoff functions InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup
and Discλ. Indeed the hypotheses of Propositions 1-2 are satisfied as the two
components of these payoff functions are prefix-linear (see Remark 1) and the
games G4i , i ∈ {1, 2}, are uniformly-determined with computable uniform opti-
mal strategies (see Theorems 4-5).
Proof (of Theorems 1 and 2, except for Inf and Sup payoffs). Let (G, v0) be an
initialized weighted game with a payoff function equal to one among InfMP,
SupMP, LimInf, LimSup and Discλ. By Remark 1, this function is prefix-linear.
Moreover, by Theorem 4, each game G4i , i ∈ {1, 2}, is uniformly-determined.
Therefore, since the hypotheses of Proposition 1 are satisfied, there exists a
finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) with memory size at most |V | + 2,
leading to Theorem 1. The complexities stated in Theorem 2 are obtained as a
consequence of Propositions 2 and 5. ⊓⊔
For Inf (resp. Sup) payoffs, the proof of Theorem 1 cannot be based on Propo-
sition 1 since none of its hypotheses is satisfied. Indeed, the payoff function Inf is
not prefix-linear (see Remark 1), and there exist Inf lexicographic payoff games
that are not uniformly-determined (see Example 5). However we get Theorems 1-
2 for Inf (resp. Sup) payoffs thanks to a polynomial reduction to LimInf (resp.
LimSup) payoffs and the fact that Theorems 1-2 hold for the latter payoffs.
Proof (of Theorems 1 and 2 for Inf and Sup payoffs). Let G = (V, V1, V2, E, r, Inf)
be an Inf weighted game and v0 be an initial vertex (the proof is similar for Sup
payoff). Let R = {r1(e) | e ∈ E} ∪ {r2(e) | e ∈ E} ∪ {+∞} be the set of weights
labeling the edges of E with, in addition, a highest new weight +∞. We construct
an initialized LimInf weighted game (G′, v′0) with G
′ = (V ′, V ′1 , V
′
2 , E
′, r′, LimInf)
as follows:
– V ′ = V ×R×R is partitioned into V ′1 = V1 ×R×R and V
′
2 = V2 ×R×R,
– E′ ⊆ V ′ × V ′ is the set of edges of E augmented with the current smallest
weights, that is, e′ = ((v, w1, w2), (v
′, w′1, w
′
2)) ∈ E
′ iff e = (v, v′) ∈ E and
w′i = min{wi, ri(e)}, with i ∈ {1, 2},
– r′ = (r′1, r
′
2) is the weight function that also remembers the current small-
est weights, that is, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, r′i(e
′) = w′i for each edge e
′ =
((v, w1, w2), (v
′, w′1, w
′
2)) ∈ E
′,
– v′0 = (v0,+∞,+∞) is the initial vertex augmented with the highest weight
+∞ for both components.
Clearly, to any play ρ in (G, v0) corresponds a unique play ρ′ in (G′, v′0),
and conversely. Moreover, by construction of G′, for all n > 0, we have ρ′n =
(ρn, w
1
n, w
2
n) with
win = min
0≤k<n
ri((ρk, ρk+1))
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since there is a finite number of possible weight values, the de-
creasing weight components of ρ′ eventually stabilise along the play. It follows
that Inf(ρ) = LimInf(ρ′).
Clearly any finite-memory secure equilibrium in (G, v0) is a finite-memory
secure equilibrium in (G′, v′0), and conversely. By Theorems 1 and 2 for LimInf
payoff, (G′, v′0) has a secure equilibrium with memory at most |V
′|+ 2 that can
be computed in polynomial time. Since |V ′| ≤ |V | · |E|2 + 1, we can conclude
that (G, v0) has a secure equilibrium with memory at most |V | · |E|2 + 3 that
can also be computed in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
In the next sections 4.2-4.5, we are going to prove Theorems 4 and 5 for the
various payoff functions. In this aim, let us first briefly recall some useful notions
and results about several classes of one-dimensional (instead of two-dimensional)
games.
4.1 Useful Background
Mean-payoff games (resp. Liminf games, discounted games) are games as in
Definition 4 except that functions r and Payoff = InfMP (resp. LimInf, Discλ) are
one-dimensional instead of two-dimensional. The comparison of two payoffs is
thus done with usual order ≤ instead of 41. As for lexicographic payoff games,
the notions of value and optimal strategies can be defined for such games. It
is a classical result that mean-payoff games are uniformly-determined [14,33].
Moreover deciding whether the value of a vertex is greater than or equal to
a given threshold is in in NP ∩ co-NP, there exists a pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm to compute the values of each vertex and optimal strategies for both
players [33]. The same results hold for discounted games [33,19]. LimInf games
are known to be uniformly-determined [7].
In [18], the authors have proposed general conditions to guarantee the uni-
form determinacy of zero-sum games G⊑ = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff,⊑) where
Payoff is any payoff function and ⊑ is any preference relation5
5 A preference relation is a complete, reflexive and transitive relation.
Theorem 6 ([18]). Suppose that for the preference relation ⊑ each zero-sum
game G⊑ = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff,⊑) such that either V1 = ∅ or V2 = ∅, the
unique player controlling all V has a uniform optimal strategy in the game G⊑.
Then for all finite two-player games G⊑ both players have uniform optimal strate-
gies in the games G⊑.
This characterization will allow us to show the uniform-determinacy of lexi-
cographic cost games with the InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, and LimSup cost functions.
The cases of Inf, Sup and Discλ will be studied differently.
We also need the next proposition about the cycle decomposition of an infinite
path in an arena (V,E). Given a path ρ, we consider its cycle decomposition into
a multiset of simple cycles as follows.6 We push successively vertices ρ0, ρ1, . . .
onto a stack. Whenever we push a vertex ρm equal to a vertex ρn in the stack (i.e.
a simple cycle ρn . . . ρm is formed), we remove it from the stack (i.e. we remove
all the vertices above ρn, but not ρn) and add it to the cycle decomposition
multiset of ρ. Notice that at any moment, the stack contains the vertices of a
simple path, thus at most |V | vertices.
Proposition 4. Let (V,E) be an arena. For each infinite path ρ in (V,E), there
exists n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0, (ρn, ρn+1) is an edge of a cycle that
appears in the cycle decomposition multiset of ρ.
Proof. As ρ is infinite, there exists n0 ∈ N such that for all n ≥ n0, each vertex
ρn is infinitely often repeated in ρ≥n0 . Consider the edge (ρn, ρn+1), with n ≥ n0.
When q = ρn is put on the stack, either a cycle is formed and removed from
the stack, or a cycle is not yet been formed. In both cases, q is at the top of the
stack. Then q′ = ρn+1 is pushed on the stack above q, as well as ρn+2, ρn+3, . . .
and formed simple cycles are successively removed. At a certain point, a simple
cycle c containing the edge (q, q′) will be formed since q appears infinitely often
along ρ. ⊓⊔
Let us now recall some useful properties about reachability games (resp. safety
games, co-Bu¨chi games, Rabin games)[19,15,26]. They are two-player zero-sum
games played on an arena which is a finite directed graph (V,E) with no weights.
A set A ⊆ V of vertices is given in the case of reachability, safety and co-Bu¨chi
games, whereas a finite set of pairs (Ak, Bk), with Ak, Bk ⊆ V is given in the
case of Rabin games. The two players play in a turn-based manner from a given
initial vertex v0. In the case of reachability (resp. safety) game, the produced
play ρ is won by player 1 if ρ visits some vertex of A (resp. no vertex of A), and
by player 2 otherwise. The set of initial vertices v0 from which player 1 has a
winning strategy can be computed in time O(|V |+ |E|), and a winning strategy
can be chosen positional and computed in time O(|V | + |E|) [19]. Moreover
deciding whether player 1 has a winning strategy from an initial vertex v0 is
known to be P-complete [20]. For co-Bu¨chi games, play ρ is won by player 1
if Inf(ρ) ∩ A = ∅ (with Inf(ρ) being the set of vertices infinitely visited along
6 We can similarly consider the cycle decomposition of finite paths ρ.
ρ), and by player 2 otherwise. For Rabin games, this condition is replaced by
∃k : Inf(ρ) ∩ Ak = ∅ ∧ Inf(ρ) ∩Bk 6= ∅. One can decide if player 1 has a winning
strategy in time O
(
n2
)
[10] for co-Bu¨chi games and in time O(np+1 · p!) [25] for
Rabin games, with n the number of vertices and p the number of pairs. Moreover
for co-Bu¨chi games, this problem is known to be P-complete, as this is already
the case for the AND-OR graph reachability problem [20].
We conclude this section with a remark that will be useful when studying
the determinacy of lexicographic payoff games.
Remark 2. Without lost of generality we can assume that the game G41 =
(V, V1, V2, E, r,Payoff,41) uses a weight function r = (r1, r2) such that ri : E →
N (instead of ri : E → Q) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Indeed all the weights appearing
in G41 have the form a
b
with a ∈ Z and b ∈ N. Let a∗ be the smallest weight
numerator (0 if weights are positive in G41) and b∗ be the least common multi-
ple of the weight denominators. Then we define a new lexicographic payoff game
G′41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r′,Payoff,41) such that r′i(e) = ri(e) · b
∗ − a∗ · b∗ for all
e ∈ E and i ∈ {1, 2}. For the payoff functions Payoff of Definition 2, given a play
ρ in G41 , its payoff is multiplied by b∗ and shifted by the value (−a∗ ·b∗,−a∗ ·b∗)
when it is seen as a play in G′41 . The same holds for values (if they exist), and
positional optimal strategies correspond in both games.
4.2 InfMP and SupMP Lexicographic Payoff Games
In this section we prove that every InfMP lexicographic payoff game is uniformly-
determined (see Theorem 4). We also give the proof of Theorem 5 for InfMP
payoff. Notice that we do not provide the proofs for SupMP payoff since they are
similar.
Theorems 4 and 5 for InfMP payoff are non trivial extensions to dimension 2
of well-known results about (one-dimensional) mean-payoff games [14,33]. In [1],
similar results have been proved for a class of zero-sum games called lexicographic
mean-payoff games. It should be noted that this class is different from our class
of InfMP lexicographic payoff games. Indeed, the authors use a lexicographic
order 4′1 on R
2 different from ours: (x1, x2) 4
′
1 (x
′
1, x
′
2) iff (x1 < x
′
1) ∨ (x1 =
x′1 ∧ x2 ≤ x
′
2), and most importantly the payoff of a play ρ is computed as
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
(r1(ρk, ρk+1), r2(ρk, ρk+1)) at the level of two-dimensional vectors
and with the lim inf using order 4′1 (whereas we proceed componentwise). An
example showing that the two definitions are not equivalent is given in [1]7.
Let us first proceed to the proof of Theorem 4 with InfMP payoff. For this
purpose we use Theorem 6. We show that each InfMP lexicographic payoff game
played by only one player is uniformly determined. At the end of this section,
we will establish the related complexity stated in Theorem 5.
7 This example is given in the ArXiv version of [1], following discussions with one of
the authors.
Uniform-Determinacy. Let G41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r, InfMP,41) be a lexicographic
payoff game with a weight function with natural weights (see Remark 2). For
each i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by |ri| = max{ri(e) | e ∈ E} the maximal weight for
component i, and by |R| = max {|r1|, |r2|} the maximal weight of the game.
Recall that 41 is a preference relation. Then, by Theorem 6, to show that
G41 is uniformly-determined, it suffices to show that if the vertices of the game
are controlled by only one player, this player has a uniform optimal strategy.
Proposition 5. Let G41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r, InfMP,41) be an InfMP lexicographic
payoff game. If V2 = ∅ (resp. V1 = ∅), then player 1 (resp. player 2) has a
uniform optimal strategy in G41 .
The proof of Proposition 5 is inspired from [18] and [1] with non trivial
adaptations. It uses the following notation and lemma. Given a simple cycle c,
we denote for each i ∈ {1, 2}
MPi(c) =
1
n−m
n−1∑
k=m
ri(ρk, ρk+1)
the mean-payoff of the cycle c according to component i.
Lemma 3 (see for instance [8]). For all sequences (an)n∈N and (bn)n∈N of
reals numbers, we have:
lim sup
n→∞
(an + bn) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
(an) + lim sup
n→∞
(bn)
lim sup
n→∞
(an − bn) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
(an)− lim sup
n→∞
(bn)
lim inf
n→∞
(an + bn) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
(an) + lim inf
n→∞
(bn)
lim inf
n→∞
(an − bn) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
(an)− lim inf
n→∞
(bn).
Proof (of Proposition 5). Let G41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r, InfMP,41) be an InfMP
lexicographic payoff game.
(a) Suppose first that V2 = ∅. Let us denote by A = (V, V1, V2, E) the arena
of G41 where V2 = ∅ and by Val
A(v) the value of v in A. Remark that, in this
case, we have that ValA(v) = supσ1∈Σ1 Payoff(〈σ1〉v) = supρ∈V ω ,ρ0=v Payoff(ρ).
Let us construct a uniform optimal strategy σ⋆1 for player 1 in A by induction
on the size |V | of A such that for all vertex v ∈ V,Payoff(〈σ⋆1〉v) = Val
A(v).
The initial case (|V | = 1) is trivial. Suppose that |V | > 1. Consider cmax a
simple cycle inA with the maximal mean-payoff (m1,m2) w.r.t. the lexicographic
order 41. Let W be the set of all the vertices of V from which there is a path
in A to reach cmax. Let us define the strategy σ⋆1 on W , such that σ
⋆
1 goes as
quickly as possible to this maximum payoff cycle and next go round this cycle
forever. The produced play ρ⋆ from a vertex of W has then payoff InfMP(ρ⋆) =
InfMP(cωmax) = (MP1(cmax),MP2(cmax)) = (m1,m2).
Let us now show that for all vertices v ∈ W any infinite play from v in A
cannot supply a payoff greater than (m1,m2). Let ρ be any play in A from v.
Let ρ≤n be any prefix of ρ. By definition of cmax, each simple cycle c of the cycle
decomposition multiset of ρ≤n satisfies
either MP1(c) = m1 and MP2(c) ≥ m2 (7)
or MP1(c) ≤ m¯1 < m1. (8)
For each prefix ρ≤n of ρ of length n, let us denote by J1(n) (resp. J2(n))
the sum of the lengths of all simple cycles in its cycle decomposition that satisfy
Property (7) (resp. Property (8)). Recall that n−J1(n)−J2(n) ≤ |V | by definition
of the cycle decomposition. First observe that for i ∈ {1, 2},
0 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
Ji(n)
n
)
≤ lim sup
n→∞
(
Ji(n)
n
)
≤ 1.
and that
lim
n→∞
J1(n) + J2(n)
n
= 1,
since
1 = lim
n→∞
n
n
≥ lim
n→∞
J1(n) + J2(n)
n
≥ lim
n→∞
n− |V |
n
= 1.
For any n ∈ N we have
n−1∑
k=0
r1(ρk, ρk+1) ≤ J1(n) ·m1 + J2(n) · m¯1 + |V | · |R|, and
n−1∑
k=0
r2(ρk, ρk+1) ≥ J1(n) ·m2.
It follows that
InfMP1(ρ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
(m1 − m¯1 + m¯1) +
J2(n)
n
· m¯1 +
|V |
n
· |R|
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
· (m1 − m¯1)
)
− lim inf
n→∞
(
−
J1(n) + J2(n)
n
· m¯1 −
|V |
n
· |R|
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
· (m1 − m¯1)
)
+ lim sup
n→∞
(
J1(n) + J2(n)
n
· m¯1
)
= lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
)
· (m1 − m¯1) + m¯1.
Recall that µ = lim infn→∞
(
J1(n)
n
)
≤ 1.
(a) If µ < 1, then InfMP1(ρ) < m1.
(b) If µ = 1, then InfMP1(ρ) ≤ m1, and
InfMP2(ρ) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
.m2
)
= m2.
We can conclude that InfMP(ρ) 41 (m1,m2).
We then have that Payoff(〈σ⋆1〉v) = supρ∈V ω,ρ0=v Payoff(ρ) = Val
A(v) =
(m1,m2). If |V | = |W |, σ⋆1 is the required uniform optimal strategy for player 1.
Else, consider the subarena A′ = A↾V ′ of A restricted to the set of vertices
V ′ = V \W . By induction, we have constructed a uniform optimal strategy σ′⋆1 for
player 1 in A′ such that for all v ∈ V ′,Payoff(
〈
σ′
⋆
1
〉
v
) = supσ1∈Σ1 Payoff(〈σ1〉v) =
ValA
′
(v). As all the plays ρ from v ∈ V \W stay in A′ by definition of the set
W , we have that ValA
′
(v) = ValA(v). The required uniform optimal strategy is
then the union of σ⋆1 (defined on W ) and σ
′⋆
1 (defined on V \W ).
(b) Let us now suppose that V1 = ∅ and show that player 2 has a uniform
optimal strategy in A. This strategy is constructed by induction on the size |V |
of A as in the previous case except that, in the induction step (when |V | > 1),
we choose a simple cycle cmin with the minimal (instead of the maximal) mean-
payoff (m1,m2) w.r.t. the lexicographic order 41. Let W be the set of all the
vertices of V from which there is a path in A to reach cmin. We define the strategy
σ⋆1 on W , such that σ
⋆
1 goes as quickly as possible to this minimum payoff cycle
and next go round this cycle forever. The produced play ρ⋆ from a vertex of W
has then cost InfMP(ρ⋆) = InfMP(cωmin) = (MP1(cmin),MP2(cmin)) = (m1,m2).
Let us now show that for all vertices v ∈ W any infinite play from v in A
cannot supply a payoff smaller than (m1,m2). Let ρ be any play in A. Let ρ≤n
be any prefix of ρ. By definition of cmin, for each simple cycle c of the cycle
decomposition multiset of ρ≤n Properties (7) and (8) are now replaced by the
next ones:
either MP1(c) = m1 and MP2(c) ≤ m2 (9)
or MP1(c) ≥ m¯1 > m1. (10)
For each prefix ρ≤n of ρ of length n, let us denote by J1(n) (resp. J2(n))
the sum of the lengths of all simple cycles in its cycle decomposition that satisfy
Property (9) (resp. Property (10)).
For all n ∈ N we have
n−1∑
k=0
r1(ρk, ρk+1) ≥ J1(n) ·m1 + J2(n) · m¯1, and
n−1∑
k=0
r2(ρk, ρk+1) ≤ J1(n) ·m2 + J2(n) · |R|+ |V | · |R|.
Let κ = lim infn→∞
J2(n)
n
. We have either κ > 0 or κ = 0. We have (notice the
usage of Lemma 3):
InfMP1(ρ) ≥ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
·m1 +
J2(n)
n
· m¯1
)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n) + J2(n)
n
·m1
)
+ lim inf
n→∞
(
J2(n)
n
· (m¯1 −m1)
)
= m1 + κ · (m¯1 −m1).
We can now prove that (m1,m2) 41 InfMP(ρ).
(a) If κ > 0, since m¯1 > m1, we have
InfMP1(ρ) ≥ m1 + κ · (m¯1 −m1) > m1
and so (m1,m2) 41 InfMP(ρ).
(b) If κ = 0, then
InfMP1(ρ) ≥ m1,
and (using again Lemma 3 and recalling that |R|,m2 ≥ 0)
InfMP2(ρ) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
·m2 +
J2(n)
n
· |R|+
|V |
n
· |R|
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
J2(n)
n
|R|
)
− lim inf
n→∞
(
−J1(n)
n
·m2 +
−|V |
n
· |R|
)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
J2(n)
n
)
· |R|+ lim sup
n→∞
(
J1(n)
n
)
·m2
+ lim sup
n→∞
(
|V |
n
· |R|
)
≤ 0 · |R|+ 1 ·m2 + 0 = m2.
In this case we thus also have (m1,m2) 41 InfMP(ρ).
We can conclude the proof with similar arguments as in case (a). ⊓⊔
Theorem 4 for InfMP follows from Theorem 6 and Proposition 5.
Complexity Results. We have proved that every InfMP lexicographic payoff game
is uniformly-determined. Let us now established the related complexities as given
in Theorem 5.
Proof (of Theorem 5 for InfMP payoff). The proof is inspired by a proof given
in [1]: we are going to sketch a reduction of InfMP lexicographic payoff games to
mean-payoff games for optimal strategies. This reduction keeps the same arena
(V,E) but replaces the weight function (r1, r2) by a single weight function r
∗. We
again suppose that the weights are positive integers by Remark 2. We know by
Theorem 4 that G41 is uniformly-determined. We can thus restrict our attention
to simple cycles. The mean-payoff of a simple cycle C in G41 is of the form ( a
n
, b
n
)
such that each component is a bounded rational (between 0 and |r1| (resp. |r2|)),
and the denominator is at most equal to |V |. We define m = |V |2 · |r2|+ 1 and
r∗ = r1 · m − r2. It follows that in the resulting mean-payoff game, the cycle
C has a mean-payoff equal to a·m−b
n
. Notice that given two simple cycles C1
and C2 in G41 , if the first components of their mean-payoff are distinct, that is,
| a1
n1
− a2
n2
| > 0, then | a1
n1
− a2
n2
| ≥ 1|V |2 because the weights are integers. By the
choice of m, let us show that
a1
n1
<
a2
n2
⇒
a1 ·m− b1
n1
<
a2 ·m− b2
n2
. (11)
Indeed, we have
a1
n1
+
1
|V |2
≤
a2
n2
a1
n1
·m+ |r2|+
1
|V |2
≤
a2
n2
·m
a1 ·m− b1
n1
≤
a1
n1
·m <
a2
n2
·m− |r2| ≤
a2 ·m− b2
n2
.
To prove the correctness of the proposed reduction, it is enough to prove that
( a1
n1
, b1
n1
) 41 (
a2
n2
, b2
n2
) in G41 if and only if a1·m−b1
n1
≤ a2·m−b2
n2
in the resulting
mean-payoff game (the comparaison of two cycle payoffs coincide in both games).
Suppose first that ( a1
n1
, b1
n1
) 41 (
a2
n2
, b2
n2
), i.e., either a1
n1
< a2
n2
, or ( a1
n1
= a2
n2
and
b1
n1
≥ b2
n2
). In both cases we get a1·m−b1
n1
≤ a2·m−b2
n2
(we use (11) in the first case).
Suppose now that a1·m−b1
n1
≤ a2·m−b2
n2
. It follows that a1
n1
≤ a2
n2
by (11). Moreover
if a1
n1
= a2
n2
, then b1
n1
≥ b2
n2
. Therefore ( a1
n1
, b1
n1
) 41 (
a2
n2
, b2
n2
).
By this reduction and classical results on mean-payoff games [14,33], we get
the three statements of Theorem 5. ⊓⊔
4.3 LimInf and LimSup Lexicographic Payoff Games
In this section, we consider LimInf lexicographic payoff games and we provide
proofs of Theorems 4 and 5 for these games. The proofs are not given for LimSup
payoff because they are simple adaptations of the ones given for LimInf payoff.
Uniform-Determinacy. The proof of Theorem 4 for LimInf payoff has the same
structure as for InfMP payoff. Let G41 be a LimInf lexicographic payoff game.
Without lost of generality, we can suppose the weights used in G41 are natural
numbers (see Remark 2). As for lexicographic payoff games with InfMP payoff
function, we show (Proposition 6) that if the vertices of the game are controlled
by only one player, this player has a uniform optimal strategy. Theorem 4 will
then follow by Theorem 6.
Proposition 6. Let G41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r, LimInf,41) be a LimInf lexicographic
payoff game. If V2 = ∅ (resp. V1 = ∅), then player 1 (resp. player 2) has a
uniform optimal strategy.
Given a simple cycle c, we denote for each i ∈ {1, 2}
Mini(c) = min
m≤k<n
ri(ρk, ρk+1)
the minimum of the cycle according to component i.
Proof (of Proposition 6). Let G41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r, LimInf,41) be a LimInf lex-
icographic poayoff game.
(a) Suppose that V2 = ∅. We then show that player 1 has a uniform op-
timal strategy. This strategy is constructed as in the proof of Proposition 6.
Let us denote by A = (V, V1, V2, E) the arena of G41 where V2 = ∅ and by
ValA(v) the value of v in A. We have that ValA(v) = supσ1∈Σ1 Payoff(〈σ1〉v) =
supρ∈V ω,ρ0=v Payoff(ρ). Let us construct a uniform optimal strategy σ
⋆
1 for player 1
in A by induction on the size |V | of A such that for all v ∈ V,Payoff(〈σ⋆1〉v) =
ValA(v).
The initial case (|V | = 1) is trivial. Suppose that |V | > 1. Consider cmax
a simple cycle in A with the maximal (Min1,Min2) payoff (m1,m2) w.r.t. the
lexicographic order 41. Let W be the set of all the vertices of V from which
there is a path in A to reach cmax. Let us define the strategy σ
⋆
1 on W , such
that σ⋆1 goes as quickly as possible to this maximum payoff cycle and next go
round this cycle forever. The produced play ρ⋆ from a vertex of W has then cost
LimInf(ρ⋆) = LimInf(cωmax) = (Min1(cmax),Min2(cmax)) = (m1,m2).
Let us now show that for all vertices v ∈ W any infinite play from v in A
cannot supply a cost greater than (m1,m2). Let ρ be any play in A from v. Let
ρ≤n be any prefix of ρ. By definition of cmax, each simple cycle c of the cycle
decomposition multiset of ρ≤n satisfies
either Min1(c) = m1 and Min2(c) ≥ m2 (12)
or Min1(c) ≤ m¯1 < m1. (13)
By Proposition 4, there is an index n0 ∈ N such that each edge (ρn, ρn+1)
with n ≥ n0, is in a simple cycle cn that appears in the cycle decomposition
multiset of ρ. Then, for n ≥ n0, we define
un =
{
1 if cycle cn satisfies Property (12)
0 if cycle cn satisfies Property (13).
Remark that lim infn→∞ un = 0 or 1.
If lim infn→∞ un = 1, then there exists some n1 ≥ n0 such that all cycles cn,
for n ≥ n1, satisfy Min1(cn) = m1 and Min2(cn) ≥ m2. Therefore LimInf1(ρ) =
m1 and LimInf2(ρ) ≥ m2.
If lim infn→∞ un = 0, there are infinitely many cycles cn, with n ≥ n0 such
that Min1(cn) ≤ m¯1 < m1. Therefore LimInf1(ρ) < m1.
It follows that in both cases LimInf(ρ) 41 (m1,m2).
We then have that Payoff(〈σ⋆1〉v) = supρ∈V ω,ρ0=v Payoff(ρ) = Val
A(v) =
(m1,m2). If |V | = |W |, σ
⋆
1 is the required uniform optimal strategy for player 1.
Else, consider the subarena A′ = A↾V ′ of A restricted to the set of vertices
V ′ = V \W . By induction, we have constructed a uniform optimal strategy σ′⋆1 for
player 1 in A′ such that for all v ∈ V ′,Payoff(
〈
σ′⋆1
〉
v
) = supσ1∈Σ1 Payoff(〈σ1〉v) =
ValA
′
(v) As all the plays ρ from v ∈ V \W stay in A′ by definition of the set
W , we have that ValA
′
(v) = ValA(v). The required uniform optimal strategy is
then the union of σ⋆1 (defined on W ) and σ
′⋆
1 (defined on V \W ).
(b) Let us now suppose that V1 = ∅ and show that player 2 has a uniform
optimal strategy in A. This strategy is constructed by induction on the size |V |
of A as in the previous case except that, in the induction step (when |V | >
1), we choose a simple cycle cmin with the minimal (instead of the maximal)
(Min1,Min2) payoff (m1,m2) w.r.t. the lexicographic order 41. Let W be the set
of all the vertices of V from which there is a path inA to reach cmin. We define the
strategy σ⋆1 onW , such that σ
⋆
1 goes as quickly as possible to this minimum payoff
cycle and next go round this cycle forever. The produced play ρ⋆ from a vertex
of W has then payoff LimInf(ρ⋆) = LimInf(cωmin) = (Min1(cmin),Min2(cmin)) =
(m1,m2). Let us now show that for all vertices v ∈ W any infinite play from v
in A cannot supply a payoff smaller than (m1,m2). Let ρ be any play in A. Let
ρ≤n be any prefix of ρ. By definition of cmin, for each simple cycle c of the cycle
decomposition multiset of ρ≤n Properties 12 and 13 are now replaced by the
next ones:
either Min1(c) = m1 and Min2(c) ≤ m2 (14)
or Min1(c) ≥ m¯1 > m1. (15)
We define
un =
{
0 if cycle cn satisfies Property (14)
1 if cycle cn satisfies Property (15).
Then, either lim infn→∞ un = 0 and LimInf1(ρ) = m1, LimInf2(ρ) ≤ m2, or
lim infn→∞ un = 1 and LimInf1(ρ) > m1. We conclude that (m1,m2) 41 LimInf(ρ).
We can conclude the proof with similar arguments as in case (a). ⊓⊔
The proof of Theorem 4 for LimInf cost follows from Theorem 6 and Propo-
sition 6.
Complexity Results. Let us now turn to complexity results and give a proof of
Theorem 5 for LimInf payoff. To get the announced polynomial complexities,
the previous reduction to finite cycle-forming games is too expensive. We here
propose another reduction to co-Bu¨chi and (one pair) Rabin games.
We have the next lemma. The proof of Theorem 5 will follow. We suppose
again that weights are natural numbers by Remark 2.
Lemma 4. Let G41 be a LimInf lexicographic payoff game, v ∈ V be a vertex
and (α, β) ∈ N2 be a pair of naturals. Deciding whether player 1 has a strategy
σ1 from v such that (α, β) 41 LimInf(〈σ1, σ2〉v) for all strategies σ2 of player 2
is P-complete.
Proof. We first prove that one can decide in O((|V | + |E|)2) whether player 1
has a strategy σ1 from v such that (α, β) 41 LimInf(〈σ1, σ2〉v) for all strategies
σ2 of player 2. Let us fix v ∈ V , (α, β) ∈ N2, and a strategy σ1 of player 1 in
G41 . Consider a strategy σ2 of player 2 and the outcome ρ = 〈σ1, σ2〉v. We have
that (α, β) 41 LimInf(ρ) iff
– there exists n ≥ 0 such that r1(ρk, ρk+1) ≥ α+ 1 for all k ≥ n, or
– there exists n ≥ 0 such that r1(ρk, ρk+1) ≥ α for all k ≥ n and r2(ρl, ρl+1) ≤
β for infinitely many l.
Using LTL notation, we abbreviate these conditions by
ρ |= (♦ r1 ≥ α+ 1) ∨ ρ |= (♦ r1 ≥ α) ∧ (♦ r2 ≤ β). (16)
The first condition is a co-Bu¨chi condition, while the second one is a Rabin
condition. These conditions can then be encoded with two Rabin pairs.
Let us construct the following Rabin game in relation with these conditions.
Firstly, from the arena (V,E) of G41 , we construct a new arena (V ′, E′) in
a way to have weights depending on vertices instead of edges. We proceed as
follows: each edge e = (v, v′) ∈ E is split into two consecutive edges. The new
intermediate vertex belongs to player 18, and it is decorated with (r1(e), r2(e)).
The vertices of V are decorated with (+∞,+∞), and V ′ has n′ = |V | + |E|
vertices. Secondly, we define two Rabin pairs (A1, B1) and (A2, B2) such that
A1 ⊆ V ′ (resp. B1 ⊆ V ′) is composed of all vertices decorated by a pair (a, b)
such that a < α + 1 (resp. b = +∞) and A2 ⊆ V
′ (resp. B2 ⊆ V
′) is composed
of all vertices decorated by a pair (a, b) such that a < α (resp. b ≤ β). For a play
ρR in the constructed Rabin game and its corresponding play ρ in G41 we have
that
ρR |= (A1, B1) ⇐⇒ ρ |= (♦ r1 ≥ α+ 1), and
ρR |= (A2, B2) ⇐⇒ ρ |= (♦ r1 ≥ α) ∧ (♦ r2 ≤ β).
It follows that player 1 has a winning strategy in the constructed Rabin game
from vertex v iff player 1 has a strategy σ1 in G41 . This property can be checked
in time O(n′p+1 · p!) with p = 1 (there is one Rabin pair). One can thus decide
in time O((|V | + |E|)2) whether player 1 has a strategy σ1 from v such that
(α, β) 41 LimInf(〈σ1, σ2〉v) for all strategies σ2 of player 2.
To conclude the proof of Lemma 4, we show that for each co-Bu¨chi game C, we
can construct a LimInf lexicographic payoff game G41C and a pair of naturals (α, β)
such that the problem of deciding if player 1 has a winning strategy from a vertex
v in C is equivalent to the problem stated in Lemma 4. Let (V,E) be the arena of
8 It could belong to player 2 since there is exactly one outgoing edge.
C and A ⊆ V be the set given for the co-Bu¨chi condition. We set (α, β) = (1, 1)
and we define G41C = (V, V1, V2, E, r, LimInf) with the reward function r such
that for all (v, v′) ∈ E, r(v, v′) = (0, 1) if v′ ∈ A, and r(v, v′) = (1, 1) otherwise.
Clearly, for every play ρ starting in v, we have Inf(ρ)∩A = ∅ iff LimInf(ρ) = (1, 1).
This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 5 for LimInf payoff). The first part is a direct consequence
of Lemma 4 by definition of the value.
The second is also obtained as a corollary of Lemma 4. Indeed, given a vertex
v, it suffices to apply it to all pairs (α, β) such that α = r1(e) and β = r2(e
′) for
some edges e, e′ ∈ E. Notice that there are |E|2 pairs. The value of v is thus the
maximum among those pairs (α, β) for which player 1 has a strategy σ1 from
v such that (α, β) 41 LimInf(〈σ1, σ2〉v) for all strategies σ2 of player 2. This
argument shows that computing the value of v can be done in polynomial time.
The third statement is a consequence of the second one, using a dichotomy on
the edges of E as proposed in [33]. We first start by computing the values Val(v)
for each v in G41 . If all the vertices of V have outdegree one, then player 1 has
a unique uniform optimal strategy. Otherwise, let v be a vertex with outdegree
d > 1. Let us remove ⌈d2⌉ of the edges leaving v, and let us compute the value
Val′(v) of v in the resulting graph. If Val′(v) = Val(v) (resp. Val′(v) 6= Val(v)),
then there is a uniform optimal strategy for player 1 which does not use any
of the removed edges (uses one of the removed edges). In both cases, we can
restrict the computation to a subgraph of G41 with at least ⌊d2⌋ fewer edges.
After a polynomial9 number of such experiments, we get the required uniform
optimal strategy for player 1 with the announced complexity. A uniform optimal
strategy for player 2 can be found in the same way. ⊓⊔
4.4 Inf and Sup Lexicographic Payoff Games
In this section, we prove Theorems 4 and 5 for Inf and Sup lexicographic payoff
games. Without lost of generality, we limit the proofs to the Inf payoff.
Positional-Determinacy. We begin by proving that these games are positionally-
determined. Some preliminary lemmas are necessary.
Lemma 5. Every Inf lexicographic payoff game G41 is determined, and its val-
ues can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Given G41 and an initial vertex v0, we derive a LimInf lexicographic payoff
game G′41 and an initial vertex v′0 = (v0,+∞,+∞), with the same construc-
tion as in the proof of Theorem 1 for Inf payoff (we augment the vertices with
the current smallest seen weights). The latter game is uniformly-determined by
Theorem 4 and its values can be computed in polynomial by Theorem 5 (for
LimInf payoff). In G′41 , let (α, β) be the value of v′0 and σ
′⋆
1 , σ
′⋆
2 be a pair of uni-
form optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2 respectively. We naturally derive
9 O(Σv∈V1 log d(v)) with d(v) being the outdegree of vertex v in G
41 .
finite-memory strategies σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2 in G
41 that mimic strategies σ′⋆1 , σ
′⋆
2 . Let us show
that in G41 , v0 has value (α, β) and σ⋆1 , σ
⋆
2 are optimal strategies
10. In G41 , let
σ2 be any strategy for player 2, and let us prove that (α, β) 41 Inf(〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v0)
(see Lemma 1). This inequality follows from (α, β) 41 LimInf(〈σ′⋆1 , σ
′
2〉v′
0
) in G′41
and Inf(〈σ⋆1 , σ2〉v0) = LimInf(〈σ
′⋆
1 , σ
′
2〉v′
0
), where σ′2 is the strategy that mimics σ2
in G′41 . Similarly we have inf(〈σ1, σ⋆2〉v0) 41 (α, β) for all strategy σ1 of player 1
in G41 . Therefore from this reduction to LimInf lexicographic payoff game, G41
is determined, and its values can be computed in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. Let (α, β) be a pair of rational numbers.
1. There exists a partition of V into W1 and W2 such that v ∈W1 iff player 1
has a (positional) strategy σ∗1 from v in G
41 such that (α, β) 41 Inf(〈σ∗1 , σ2〉v)
for all strategies σ2 of player 2.
2. Similarly, there exists a partition of V into T1 and T2 such that v ∈ T2 iff
player 2 has a (positional) strategy σ∗2 from v in G
41 such that Inf(〈σ1, σ∗2〉v) 41
(α, β) for all strategies σ1 of player 1.
Moreover, the two partitions of V and the two strategies σ∗1 , σ
∗
2 can be computed
in polynomial time.
Proof. We only prove the first statement, the second one is proved similarly.
From G41 , we construct the same arena A = (V ′, E′) as in Lemma 4 in a way
to have weights depending on vertices instead of edges. Recall that V ′ = V ∪ E
such that each edge e of G41 is split into two consecutive edges where the new
intermediate vertex s is decorated with (r1(s), r2(s)) and belongs to player 1.
The vertices v of V are decorated with (r1(v), r2(v)) = (+∞,+∞).
Let (α, β) be a pair of rational numbers. We are going to construct a partition
of V ′ into two setsW1 andW2 such that for all v
′ ∈ V ′, we have that v′ ∈W1∩V
iff player 1 has a strategy σ∗1 (that can be chosen positional) from v
′ in G41 such
that (α, β) 41 Inf(〈σ∗1 , σ2〉v′) for all strategies σ2 of player 2. The restriction to
V of this partition leads to the required partition of V of Lemma 6. Recall that
(α, β) 41 Inf(ρ), with ρ = 〈σ∗1 , σ2〉v′ iff
– either r1(ρn, ρn+1) > α for all n,
– or r1(ρn, ρn+1) ≥ α for all n, and r2(ρn, ρn+1) ≤ β for one n.
In the sequel, let us use notation 〈〈i〉〉A
′
φ for the set of vertices v′ inside a game
restricted to the subarena A′ of A, from which player i has a strategy that
ensures an LTL formula φ, with φ describing a reachability objective. To get the
partition of V ′ into W1 and W2, we proceed step by step.
1. We consider W<α2 = 〈〈2〉〉
A♦ {s ∈ V ′ | r1(s) < α}, that is, the set of vertices
v′ in A from which player 2 can ensure to reach a vertex s decorated with
r1(s) < α. Clearly, from such vertices v
′ ∈ V ∩W<α2 seen as vertices in G
41 ,
player 1 cannot ensure (α, β) 41 Inf(〈σ1, σ2〉v′) against all strategies σ2 of
player 2. In other words, W<α2 ⊆W2.
10 In the proof of Theorem 4 for Inf payoff, we will explain how to obtain positional
optimal strategies.
2. Let A1 = A|V ′\W<α
2
be the subarena A restricted to vertices in V 1 =
V ′ \W<α2 . Notice that in subarena A1, every vertex s ∈ V
1 is decorated
with r1(s) ≥ α since otherwise s ∈ W
<α
2 . We consider the set W
≤β
1 =
〈〈1〉〉A1♦
{
s ∈ V 1 | r2(s) ≤ β
}
. We get that W≤β1 ⊆ W1. Moreover, for all
v′ ∈W≤β1 ∩V , player 1 has a positional strategy σ
∗
1 from v
′ in G41 such that
(α, β) 41 Inf(〈σ∗1 , σ2〉v′). Indeed this strategy is given by the positional strat-
egy that is used in the reachability game played on A1 to reach a vertex s
decorated with r2(s) ≤ β.
3. We define the subarena A2 = A|V 1\W≤β
1
of A restricted to V 2 = V 1 \W≤β1 .
Each vertex s of A2 is decorated with r1(s) ≥ α and r2(s) > β. With the set
W=α2 = 〈〈2〉〉
A2♦
{
s ∈ V 2 | r1(s) = α
}
, we have that W=α2 ⊆W2.
4. Since each vertex v′ of V ′\(W<α2 ∪W
≤β
1 ∪W
=α
2 ) is decorated with r1(v
′) > α,
it follows that v′ belongs to W1. Moreover, there exists a positional strategy
σ∗1 of player 1 from v
′ in G41 such that (α, β) 41 Inf(〈σ∗1 , σ2〉v′). It is given
by a positional strategy used in the safety game played on A2 to avoid all
vertices s decorated with r1(s) = α.
Therefore, we get required partition of V ′ intoW2 = W
<α
2 ∪W
=α
2 andW1 = V
′\
W2. Moreover, as this partition has been obtained thanks to three reachability
games, the sets W<α2 , W
≤β
1 and W
=α
2 can be computed in O(|V |+ 3 · |E|)
11, as
well as the positional strategy σ∗1 [19]. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 4 for Inf payoff). Let G41 be an Inf lexicographic payoff
game. By Lemma 5, we know that G41 is determined. Given an initial vertex v0
with value (α, β), let us indicate how to construct positional optimal strategies
for both players. We partition V into the sets W1 and W2 (resp. T1 and T2)
as indicated in Lemma 6. By Definition 6, we have that v0 ∈ W1 ∩ T2, and
Lemma 6 provides positional strategies σ∗1 and σ
∗
2 that are optimal. Notice that
these strategies depend on v0 since they depend on (α, β). ⊓⊔
Complexity Results. Let us now turn to the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof (of Theorem 5 for Inf payoff). The second statement is direct consequence
of Lemma 5. A polynomial time algorithm for the first and third statements
follows from Lemma 6.
To establish P-completeness for the first statement, we show that for each
safety game S, we can construct an Inf lexicographic payoff game G41S and a pair
of naturals (α, β) such that the problem of deciding if player 1 has a winning
strategy from a vertex v0 in S is equivalent to the value problem stated in the
first statement of Theorem 5 for Inf payoff. Let (V,E) be the arena of S and
A ⊆ V be the set of vertices that player 1 wants to avoid. We set (α, β) = (1, 1)
and we define G41S = (V ∪{w}, V1∪{w}, V2, E
′ = E∪{(w, v0)}, r, Inf) with w /∈ V
and r such that for all (v, v′) ∈ E′, r(v, v′) = (0, 1) if v′ ∈ A, and r(v, v′) = (1, 1)
otherwise. Clearly, for every play ρ starting in v0 in S, we have a corresponding
11 The arena A has |V |+ |E| vertices and 2 · |E| edges.
path wρ in G41S such that ρn /∈ A for all n ≥ 0 iff Inf(wρ) = (1, 1). Therefore,
deciding whether player 1 has a winning strategy from v0 in S is equivalent to
decide whether the value of w in G41S is at least equal to (α, β) = (1, 1). ⊓⊔
4.5 Discλ Lexicographic Payoff Games
In this section we study the Discλ payoff function for which we prove Theorems 4
and 5.
Uniform-Determinacy. The proof of Theorem 4 for Discλ lexicographic payoff
games follows from the simple next idea: player 1 first tries to maximize his
payoff limited to the first component and then to minimize his payoff limited to
the second component. Player 1 can use a uniform strategy to achieve this goal
because at each step, the game reduces to a one-dimensional discounted game.
Let us now go into the details. The proof of Theorem 4 for Discλ payoff will
be obtained as a consequence of Lemmas 7 and 8 given below.
Let λ ∈ ]0, 1[ and G41 = (V, V1, V2, E, r,Disc
λ,41) be a lexicographic payoff
game with weight function Discλ. We derive from G41 the discounted game D =
(V, V1, V2, E, r1,Disc
λ
1 ) such that the weights are limited to the first component
r1 of r, and player 1 wants to maximize the payoff Disc
λ
1 while player 2 wants to
minimize it. By [33], this game is uniformly-determined, and the value of each
vertex v ∈ V and uniform strategies can be defined by the following system of
equations:
Val(v) =
{
max(v,v′)∈E {(1 − λ) · r1(v, v
′) + λ · Val(v′)} if v ∈ V1,
min(v,v′)∈E {(1− λ) · r1(v, v
′) + λ · Val(v′)} if v ∈ V2.
(17)
We denote by E′ the set of all optimal edges of E, i.e. edges realizing the
maximum (resp. minimum) for player 1 (resp. player 2) in system (17).
The next lemma states that against an optimal strategy of player 1 in D,
player 2 should rather choose edges in E′.
Lemma 7. 1. Let σ⋆1 be a uniform optimal strategy of player 1 in D, and let
σ2 be a strategy of player 2 in D. Let v be a vertex in V with value Val(v)
in D. If ρ = 〈σ⋆1 , σ2〉v contains two vertices ρl, ρl+1 with (ρl, ρl+1) ∈ E \ E
′,
then Discλ1 (〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v) > Val(v).
2. Similarly let σ⋆2 be a uniform optimal strategy of player 2, and σ1 be a strategy
of player 1. If ρ = 〈σ1, σ
⋆
2〉v contains two vertices ρl, ρl+1 with (ρl, ρl+1) ∈
E \ E′, then Discλ1 (〈σ1, σ
⋆
2〉v) < Val(v).
Proof. We only give the proof for the first statement, the proof being similar for
the second one. Notice that player 1 only uses edges in E′.
Suppose that player 2 follows a strategy σ2 such that ρ = 〈σ⋆1 , σ2〉v uses at
least one edge in E \E′. We consider the smallest index l ≥ 0 such that ρl ∈ V2
and (ρl, ρl+1) ∈ E \ E′.
On one hand, we have by (17)
Val(v) = (1− λ) ·
l−1∑
k=0
λk · r1(ρk, ρk+1) + λ
l · Val(ρl). (18)
On the other hand, by optimality of σ⋆1 , we have that
Discλ1 (〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v) = (1− λ) ·
l∑
k=0
λk · r1(ρk, ρk+1) + λ
l+1 · Discλ1
(〈
σ⋆1 , σ2|ρ≤l
〉
ρl+1
)
≥ (1− λ) ·
l∑
k=0
λk · r1(ρk, ρk+1) + λ
l+1 · Val(ρl+1).
Then by definition of l, we have
Discλ1 (〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v) > (1 − λ) ·
l−1∑
k=0
λk · r1(ρk, ρk+1) + λ
l ·Val(ρl). (19)
By (18) and (19), we can conclude that Discλ1 (〈σ
⋆
1 , σ2〉v) > Val(v). ⊓⊔
We have shown that if both players play optimally in D, then the produced
outcome uses edges of E′ only. We now consider the discounted game D′ =
(V, V1, V2, E
′, r2,Disc
λ
2 ) such that the edges are limited to E
′ and the weight
function is now r2. Another difference is that player 1 wants to minimize his
payoff (now seen as a cost) while player 2 wants to maximize it.
The following lemma describes values and optimal strategies of the lexico-
graphic payoff game G41 in relation with the ones of discounted games D and
D′. Theorem 4 for Discλ payoff is a consequence of this lemma.
Lemma 8. 1. Let v ∈ V be a vertex. If v has value Val(v) in D and β(v) in
D′, then v has value (Val(v), β(v)) in G41 .
2. A uniform optimal strategy in D′ is optimal in G41 .
Proof. Let τ⋆1 , τ
⋆
2 be uniform optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2 respec-
tively in D′. Suppose that vertex v has value Val(v) in D and value β(v) in
D′. By Lemma 1, it suffices to show that for all strategies σ1, σ2 for player 1
and player 2 respectively in G41 , we have Discλ(〈σ1, τ⋆2 〉v) 41 (Val(v), β(v)) 41
Discλ(〈τ⋆1 , σ2〉v).
Let ρ = 〈τ⋆1 , σ2〉v. We are going to show that (Val(v), β(v)) 41 Disc
λ(ρ). As
τ⋆1 is a strategy in D
′, it is an optimal strategy in D. Therefore Discλ1 (ρ) ≥ Val(v).
If this inequality is strict, then (Val(v), β(v)) 41 Disc
λ(ρ). Let us thus suppose
that Discλ1 (ρ) = Val(v). By Lemma 7, the outcome ρ uses edges of E
′ only and is
then an outcome in D′. By optimality of τ⋆1 in D
′, it follows that Discλ2 (ρ) ≤ β(v),
and thus (Val(v), β(v)) 41 Disc
λ(ρ).
We show similarly that Discλ(〈σ1, τ⋆2 〉v) 41 (Val(v), β(v)). ⊓⊔
Complexity Results. Let us now provide a proof of Theorem 5 for Discλ payoff.
Proof (of Theorem 5 for Discλ payoff). We begin with the second statement.
By Lemma 8, we know that if v has value Val(v) in D and β(v) in D′, then v
has value (Val(v), β(v)) in G41 . The value Val(v) of each v in the discounted
game D can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time [33]. Once these values
are computed in D, the subgame D′ can be computed in polynomial time by
substituting each value Val(v) in system (17) and removing each edge that does
not realise the maximum (resp. minimum) for player 1 (resp. player 2) in the
resulting system. The value β(v) of each vertex v in the discounted game D′ can
be computed in pseudo-polynomial time.
Notice that we also have an algorithm in NP ∩ co-NP to compute the value
(Val(v), β(v)) of a given vertex v of G41 . Let us explain the main ideas. Recall
that in discounting games, deciding whether the value of a vertex is greater
than or equal to a given threshold is in NP ∩ co-NP, and that the solutions to
a system like (17) can be written with polynomially many bits [33,19]. Hence,
there is an exponential number of possibilities for the values of a discounted
game. To compute such a value, we can apply a dichotomy that uses the previous
decision problem in NP ∩ co-NP a polynomial number of times. We thus have
an algorithm that uses a polynomial number of calls to an oracle in NP ∩ co-
NP. Since PNP∩co-NP = NP∩ co-NP [3], we get an algorithm in NP ∩ co-NP to
compute the value (Val(v), β(v)) of vertex v in G41 .
Let us turn to the first statement of Theorem 5. Let (α, β) be a pair of rational
numbers, and let v be a vertex. To check whether (α, β) 41 (Val(v), β(v)), we
compute (Val(v), β(v)) in NP ∩ co-NP as just explained, and then make the
comparison with (α, β).
For the third statement, by Lemma 8, we also know that a uniform optimal
strategy in D′ is optimal in G41 . Uniform optimal strategies in discounted games
can be constructed in pseudo-polynomial time [33], and we have seen before that
D′ can also be constructed in pseudo-polynomial time. ⊓⊔
5 Study of Problems 3 and 4
In Section 4, we have studied the determinacy of lexicographic payoff games
and the related complexities. From these results we were able to prove Theo-
rems 1 and 2 about the existence and the construction of a secure equilibrium
in weighted games with the payoff functions of Definition 2.
The aim of this section is to provide a proof of Theorem 3 about the con-
strained existence of a secure equilibrium in such games (see Problem 3). Thanks
to Proposition 3 that provides a general framework for solving Problem 3, it re-
mains to study Problem 4 about the constraint existence of a path in a graph
with weights and values. Hence we first study the latter problem. We then derive
a proof of Theorem 3 for InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup, Inf and Sup payoffs. We
leave the discounted case open. However we show that a solution in this case
would provide a solution to an open problem mentioned in [9] itself related to
other difficult open problems in mathematics [2].
5.1 Solution for Problem 4
Let us first show that Problem 4 is decidable for InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and
LimSup payoffs. The approach that we develop is inspired by proof techniques
proposed in [30].
Theorem 7. Let G = (V,E, v0, r,Val) be a finite directed graph with an initial
vertex v0, a weight function r, and a value function Val. Let µ, ν ∈ (Q∪{±∞})2
be two thresholds. Then for Payoff = InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup, one
can decide in polynomial time whether there exists an infinite path ρ in G such
that ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},Vali(ρk) 4i Payoff(ρ≥k), and µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν.
The proof of this theorem is based on the next lemma.
Lemma 9. One can decide in polynomial time whether there exists an infinite
path ρ in G such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, µi ∼i Payoffi(ρ) ∼
′
i νi with ∼i,∼
′
i ∈
{<,≤}.
Proof. We begin with InfMP payoff (the proof can be easily adapted to SupMP
payoff). Lemma 9 is stated in [30] and proved in [31], but for ∼i,∼
′
i equal to
≤ only. The proposed proof reduces the existence of the required path ρ to the
existence of a solution of a linear program (there is no linear objective function
to optimize, just a finite set of linear constraints to solve). One can check in
polynomial time whether there exists a solution to a linear program [29]. In our
case, the proof of [31] leads to a set of linear constraints with both strict and
non strict inequalities. One can also check in polynomial time the existence of a
solution of such a set of constraints (see Lemma 11 in the appendix).
In the case of LimInf payoff, let us show a reduction to the emptiness problem
for Rabin automata (the proof is similar for LimSup payoff). Let ρ be a path in G
starting in v0 such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, µi ∼i LimInfi(ρ) ∼′i νi. Equivalently,
for each i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists ni ≥ 0 such that µi ∼i ri(ρk, ρk+1) for all
k ≥ ni, and ri(ρl, ρl+1) ∼′i νi for infinitely many l. This is the conjonction
of two Rabin conditions, one for each component i. From G, we construct a
Rabin automaton Ri, i ∈ {1, 2}, with initial vertex v0, and sets of vertices and
edges V ′i , E
′
i defined as follows. Each edge e = (v, v
′) ∈ E is split into two
consecutive edges, and the new intermediate vertex is decorated with ri(e). The
set V ′i has thus |V | + |E| vertices, such that vertices of V are decorated with
+∞. We then define one Rabin pair (Ai, Bi) such that Ai ⊆ V ′i (resp. Bi ⊆ V
′
i )
is composed of all vertices decorated by a such that ¬(µi ∼i a) (resp. by b such
that b ∼′i νi). Consider the Rabin automaton R being the intersection of the
automata R1 and R2. We have that there exists an infinite path ρ in G such
that ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, µi ∼i Payoffi(ρ) ∼
′
i νi if and only if there exists an accepting
path in R. The latter property can be checked in polynomial time [21]. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 7). Notice that each Payoffi is prefix-independent in Theo-
rem 7 (see Remark 1). Hence condition ∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},Vali(ρk) 4i Payoff(ρ≥k)
can be replaced by
∀k ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, Vali(ρk) 4i Payoff(ρ). (20)
Algorithm 1 ConstrainedExistence(G,µ, ν)
1: for each s1, s2 ∈ V do
2: Compute the subgraphG′ ofG whose vertices v are such that Vali(v) 4i Val
i(si),
for i ∈ {1, 2}
3: if there exists a play ρ in G′ such that Vali(si) 4i Payoff(ρ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, and
µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν then
4: return True
5: end if
6: end for
7: return False
We thus propose Algorithm 1 to solve Problem 4.
To prove its soundness, assume that the algorithm returns True. Hence, there
exist a subgraph G′ of G depending on two vertices s1, s2, and a play ρ in G
′
such that Vali(si) 4i Payoff(ρ), for i ∈ {1, 2}, and µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν. It follows
that ρ is a play in G that satisfies (20) and µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν.
To prove that the algorithm is complete, let ρ be a play that satisfies (20) and
µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν. For each i, let si ∈ V be such that Val
i(si) is the maximum
value among Vali(ρk), k ≥ 0 (for the order 4i). Therefore Val
i(si) 4i Payoff(ρ),
for i ∈ {1, 2}. It follows that ρ is a play in the subgraph G′ of G whose vertices
v are such that Vali(v) 4i Val
i(si), for i ∈ {1, 2}. As µ ≤ Payoff(ρ) ≤ ν, the
algorithm will return True.
Let us now explain how to check the existence of a path as indicated in line 3
of Algorithm 1. If one recalls the definition of the orders 41 and 42, one notices
that the condition that a path ρ has to satisfy in line 3 is equivalent to the
disjunction of four conditions of the form ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, xi ∼i Payoffi(ρ) ∼
′
i yi with
x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})2 and ∼i,∼′i ∈ {<,≤}. The latter conditions can be checked
in polynomial time by Lemma 9.
Hence, Algorithm 1 is correct and works in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
5.2 Solution to Problem 3
We now have all the required material to prove Theorem 3 for all the payoffs
except Discλ payoff. We begin with InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup payoffs,
since Inf and Sup payoffs require a separate proof.
Proof (of Theorem 3 for InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup payoffs). By Re-
mark 1, and Theorems 4, 5 and 7, we see that the hypotheses of Proposition 3 are
satisfied. Therefore, given an initialized weighted game (G, v0) and two thresholds
µ, ν ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞})2, one can decide whether there exists a secure equilibrium
(σ1, σ2) in (G, v0) such that µ ≤ Payoff(〈σ1, σ2〉v0) ≤ ν. Let us come back to the
algorithm that was proposed to solve this problem and let us study its complex-
ity (see the proof of Proposition 3): (1) we compute Vali(v) for each vertex v of
G4i , i ∈ {1, 2}; (2) we construct from (G, v0) the graph G = (V,E, v0, r,Val) on
which Algorithm 1 is applied. For each payoff InfMP, SupMP, LimInf and LimSup,
step (2) can be done in polynomial time by Theorem 7. For LimInf and LimSup
payoffs, step (1) can also be done in polynomial time by Theorem 5.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that step (1) is in NP ∩ co-NP for
InfMP and SupMP payoffs. By Theorem 5, we know that (a) optimal strategies
are uniform for InfMP and SupMP lexicographic payoff games, and (b) deciding
whether the value of a vertex is greater than or equal to a given threshold is
in NP ∩ co-NP. Therefore, by (a) the value of a vertex is a bounded rational
(between 0 and |R|12) whose denominator is at most equal to |V | (the maximal
length of a simple cycle), thus leading to an exponential number of possibilities.
To compute this value, we can apply a simple dichotomy that uses (b). We thus
have an algorithm using a polynomial number of calls to an oracle in NP ∩ co-NP.
Since PNP∩co-NP = NP∩ co-NP [3], step (1) is in NP ∩ co-NP as announced. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Theorem 3 for Inf and Sup payoffs). We use the same reduction to
LimInf and LimSup weighted games as done in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2 for
Inf and Sup payoffs. As Theorem 3 holds for LimInf and LimSup payoffs, it also
holds for Inf and Sup payoffs. ⊓⊔
5.3 Particular Case of Discλ Payoff
In this section, we consider Discλ weighted games. We are going to show that
Problem 3 for these games is related to the next problem whose decidability is
unknown [9]. Moreover the latter problem is related to other hard open problems
in diverse mathematical fields according to [2].
Problem 5. Given three rational numbers a, b and t, and a rational discount
factor λ ∈ ]0, 1[, does there exist an infinite sequence w = w0w1 . . . ∈ {a, b}ω
such that
∑∞
k=0 wkλ
k is equal to t?
Let us provide the next reduction of Problem 5 to Problem 3 for Discλ payoff.
Let a, b, t ∈ Q and a rational factor λ ∈]0, 1[. We consider the Discλ weighted
game (Ga,b, v0) played on the arena depicted in Figure 4, where c is a rational
number such that c > max {|a|, |b|}.13 We also consider the thresholds µ =
((1−λ) · t,−(1−λ) · t) and ν = (+∞,+∞). Notice that threshold ν imposes no
constraint. We want to show the next proposition:
Proposition 7. There exists a sequence w ∈ {a, b}ω such that
∑∞
k=0 wkλ
k = t
if and only if there exists a secure equilibrium in (Ga,b, v0) with outcome ρ such
that µ ≤ Discλ(ρ) ≤ ν.
In the next lemma, we denote by A the subarena of Ga,b restricted to the set
of vertices {v0, v1}.
Lemma 10. For all infinite paths ρ of Ga,b starting in v0, ρ is a path in A if
and only if there exists a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (Ga,b, v0) with outcome ρ.
12 Under Remark 2, recall that |R| is the maximal weight of the game.
13 Notice that (Ga,b, v0) have mutiple edges between two vertices. Adequate intermedi-
ate vertices should be added to respect Definition 1.
v0 v1
v2
(b,−b)
(a,−a)
(−c,−c) (a,−a)
(b,−b)
(−c,−c)
(−c,−c)
Fig. 4. The Discλ weighted game Ga,b
Proof. Suppose that ρ is a path in A. We constuct the strategy profile (σ1, σ2) as
follows. Both strategies follow ρ, and as soon as a player deviates from this path,
the other player immediately deviates to vertex v2. It is clear that no player has
an incentive to deviate. Indeed both players want to maximize their discounted
sum, and the self loop on vertex v2 is labelled with −c which is strictly smaller
than all the weights in the subarena A. So no deviation from ρ is profitable, and
(σ1, σ2) is a secure equilibrium.
Suppose now that ρ is the outcome of a secure equilibrium (σ1, σ2) in (G
a,b, v0).
By contradiction, assume that ρ visits vertex v2. Consider the smallest k such
that ρk+1 = v2. Without lost of generality suppose that ρk = v0. Then player 1
has a strategy σ′1 that goes to v1 and thus avoids going to v2 (for at least one
more round). This is a profitable deviation for him, because all the edges that
go to v2 have reward (−c,−c), which is strictly smaller than rewards in the sub-
arena A. This is in contradiction with (σ1, σ2) being a secure equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Proposition 7). Lemma 10 states that paths ρ in A that start in v0 are
exactly outcomes of secure equilibria in (Ga,b, v0). Moreover, by definition of the
weight function of Ga,b, we have Discλ1 (ρ) = −Disc
λ
2 (ρ). Therefore there exists
a sequence w ∈ {a, b}ω such that
∑∞
k=0 wkλ
k = t if and only if there exists a
secure equilibrium in (Ga,b, v0) with outcome ρ such that µ ≤ Disc
λ(ρ) (≤ ν). ⊓⊔
We have thus shown that Problem 5 reduces to Problem 3 for Discλ payoff.
Therefore Problem 5 is decidable if Problem 3 is itself decidable for this payoff.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied Problems 1-3 about secure equilibria in two-player
weighted games, and proposed three general frameworks in which we can solve
them. We have proved that weighted games with a classical payoff function like
InfMP, SupMP, LimInf, LimSup, Inf, Sup and Discλ, all fall in these frameworks,
except the Discλ payoff for Problem 3 (see Tables 1- 2). We have shown that this
particular problem is linked to another challenging open problem [2,9].
Our approach was inspired by the recent work [6] that states the existence
of Nash equilibria in a large class of multi-player weighted games. As in [6], we
have considered two particular zero-sum games G41 , G42 associated with the
initial game G; we have proved that they are uniformly-determined and studied
their complexity for all the classical payoffs (see Table 3). These results are very
interesting on their own right, and to the best of our knowledge, were not studied
in the literature, except for a variant of the InfMP payoff studied in [1]. For InfMP
payoff, our proofs were inspired by techniques developed in [1] and [30], however
with far from trivial adaptations.
Independently of our paper, in [27], the authors give general hypotheses on
multi-player weighted games that guarantee the existence of a secure equilibrium.
These hypotheses are satisfied by the weighted games studied in this paper with
LimInf, LimSup, Inf, Sup and Discλ payoffs (but not with InfMP and SupMP
payoffs). Thus for these payoffs, Problem 1 is also positively solved thanks to
the results proved in [27] (however with no indication about the existence of a
secure equilibrium that is finite-memory).
Acknowledgments
We thank Jean Cardinal, Martine Labbe´, Quentin Menet, and David Sbabo for
fruitful discussions.
References
1. R. Bloem, K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, and B. Jobstmann. Better quality in
synthesis through quantitative objectives. In CAV, volume 5643 of LNCS, pages
140–156. Springer, 2009.
2. U. Boker and J. Otop. personal communication, 2014.
3. G. Brassard. A note on the complexity of cryptography (corresp.). IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Theory, 25(2):232–233, 1979.
4. T. Brihaye, V. Bruye`re, and J. De Pril. Equilibria in quantitative reachability
games. In CSR, volume 6072 of LNCS, pages 72–83. Springer, 2010.
5. T. Brihaye, V. Bruye`re, J. De Pril, and H. Gimbert. On subgame perfection in
quantitative reachability games. Logical Methods in Computer Science, 9, 2012.
6. T. Brihaye, J. De Pril, and S. Schewe. Multiplayer cost games with simple Nash
equilibria. In LFCS, volume 7734 of LNCS, pages 59–73. Springer, 2013.
7. K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, and T. A. Henzinger. A survey of stochastic games
with limsup and liminf objectives. In ICALP, volume 5556 of LNCS, pages 1–15.
Springer, 2009.
8. K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, and T. A. Henzinger. Quantitative languages. ACM
Trans. Comput. Log., 11, 2010.
9. K. Chatterjee, V. Forejt, and D. Wojtczak. Multi-objective discounted reward
verification in graphs and mdps. In LPAR, volume 8312 of LNCS, pages 228–242,
2013.
10. K. Chatterjee and M. Henzinger. An O(n2) time algorithm for alternating Bu¨chi
games. In SODA, pages 1386–1399. SIAM, 2012.
11. K. Chatterjee and T. A. Henzinger. Assume-guarantee synthesis. In TACAS,
volume 4424 of LNCS, pages 261–275. Springer, 2007.
12. K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, and M. Jurdzinski. Games with secure equilibria.
Theor. Comput. Sci., 365:67–82, 2006.
13. J. De Pril. Equilibria in Multiplayer Cost Games. PhD thesis, UMONS, 2013.
14. A. Ehrenfeucht and J. Mycielski. Positional strategies for mean payoff games. Int.
Journal of Game Theory, 8:109–113, 1979.
15. E. A. Emerson and C. S. Jutla. The complexity of tree automata and logics of
programs (extended abstract). In FOCS, pages 328–337. IEEE Comp. Soc., 1988.
16. E. A. Emerson and C. S. Jutla. Tree automata, mu-calculus and determinacy. In
FOCS, pages 368–377. IEEE Comp. Soc., 1991.
17. D. Fisman, O. Kupferman, and Y. Lustig. Rational synthesis. In TACAS, volume
6015 of LNCS, pages 190–204. Springer, 2010.
18. H. Gimbert and W. Zielonka. Games where you can play optimally without any
memory. In CONCUR, pages 428–442, 2005.
19. E. Gra¨del, W. Thomas, and T. Wilke, editors. Automata, Logics, and Infinite
Games: A Guide to Current Research, volume 2500 of LNCS. Springer, 2002.
20. N. Immerman. Number of quantifiers is better than number of tape cells. J.
Comput. Syst. Sci., 22:384–406, 1981.
21. V. King, O. Kupferman, and M. Y. Vardi. On the complexity of parity word
automata. In FoSSaCS, volume 2030 of LNCS, pages 276–286. Springer, 2001.
22. M. Klimos, K. G. Larsen, F. Stefanak, and J. Thaarup. Nash equilibria in con-
current priced games. In LATA, volume 7183 of LNCS, pages 363–376. Springer,
2012.
23. D. Martin. Borel determinacy. Annals of Mathematics, 102:363–371, 1975.
24. J. F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. In PNAS, volume 36, pages
48–49. National Academy of Sciences, 1950.
25. N. Piterman and A. Pnueli. Faster solutions of Rabin and Streett games. In LICS,
pages 275–284. IEEE Comp. Soc., 2006.
26. A. Pnueli and R. Rosner. On the synthesis of a reactive module. In POPL, pages
179–190. ACM Press, 1989.
27. J. D. Pril, J. Flesch, J. Kuipers, G. Schoenmakers, and K. Vrieze. Existence
of secure equilibrium in multi-player games with perfect information. CoRR,
abs/1405.1615, 2014.
28. P. J. Ramadge and W. M. Wonham. Supervisory control of a class of discrete event
processes. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 25:206–230, 1987.
29. A. Schrijver. Theory of Linear and Integer Programming. John Wiley and Sons,
1998.
30. M. Ummels and D. Wojtczak. The complexity of Nash equilibria in limit-average
games. In CONCUR, volume 6901 of LNCS, pages 482–496. Springer, 2011.
31. M. Ummels and D. Wojtczak. The complexity of Nash equilibria in limit-average
games. CoRR, abs/1109.6220, 2011.
32. Y. Velner, K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, T. A. Henzinger, A. Rabinovich, and J.-F.
Raskin. The complexity of multi-mean-payoff and multi-energy games. CoRR,
abs/1209.3234, 2012.
33. U. Zwick and M. Paterson. The complexity of mean payoff games on graphs. Theor.
Comput. Sci., 158:343–359, 1996.
Appendix
Lemma 11. Let {
A¯i · x¯ > bi 1 ≤ i ≤ n
A¯n+j · x¯ ≥ bn+j 1 ≤ j ≤ m
be a system of n strict linear constraints and m non strict linear constraints.
Then one can decide in polynomial time whether this system has a solution.
Proof. The problem of deciding if the previous system S has a solution can be
reduced to the following linear program P where y is a new variable:
max y
{
A¯i · x¯− y ≥ bi 1 ≤ i ≤ n
A¯n+j · x¯ ≥ bn+j 1 ≤ j ≤ m
If P has no solution, then S has no solution neither. If P has a solution, depending
on whether the optimal value y satisfies y > 0 or y ≤ 0, then S has a solution
or not. ⊓⊔
